Archive for the ‘Legal defintions and citizen status’ Category


June 26, 2017

Here is a observation that no one realizes or even knows it exists. Here is a problem that may be brought before a court if you are drug into one. But it is better used administratively. Just a hypotheses. Could it work? Who knows.

(1) You work for a company
(2) You receive a negotiable instrument for your work
(3) You have to cash it at a bank
(4) You are given federal reserve notes in exchange.
(5) You have not been paid anything but worthless securities.

So now let’s put on your thinking caps and do some digging starting with

TITLE 26 > Subtitle A > CHAPTER 1 > Subchapter B > PART VI > § 165

§ 165. Losses
Release date: 2003-05-15

(a) General rule
There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.
(b) Amount of deduction
For purposes of subsection (a), the basis for determining the amount of the deduction for any loss shall be the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for determining the loss from the sale or other disposition of property.
(c) Limitation on losses of individuals
In the case of an individual, the deduction under subsection (a) shall be limited to——-
(1) losses incurred in a trade or business;
(2) losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not connected with a trade or business; and
(3) except as provided in subsection (h), losses of property not connected with a trade or business or a transaction entered into for profit, if such losses arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft.
(d) Wagering losses
Losses from wagering transactions shall be allowed only to the extent of the gains from such transactions.
(e) Theft losses
For purposes of subsection (a), any loss arising from theft shall be treated as sustained during the taxable year in which the taxpayer discovers such loss.
(f) Capital losses
Losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets shall be allowed only to the extent allowed in sections 1211 and 1212.

(g) Worthless securities
(1) General rule
If any security which is a capital asset becomes worthless during the taxable year, the loss resulting therefrom shall, for purposes of this subtitle, be treated as a loss from the sale or exchange, on the last day of the taxable year, of a capital asset.

(2) Security defined
For purposes of this subsection, the term “security” means-
(A) a share of stock in a corporation;
(B) a right to subscribe for, or to receive, a share of stock in a corporation; or
(C) a bond, debenture, note, or certificate, or other evidence of indebtedness, issued by a corporation or by a government or political subdivision thereof, with interest coupons or in registered form.

Ok so now you have been given “evidences of debt” for your work. You have never made “income” but received evidences of debt. The US Treasury admits to (g) above in its website wherein the website states,

Federal Reserve notes are legal tender currency notes. The twelve Federal Reserve Banks issue them into circulation pursuant to the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. A commercial bank belonging to the Federal Reserve System can obtain Federal Reserve notes from the Federal Reserve Bank in its district whenever it wishes. It must pay for them in full, dollar for dollar, by drawing down its account with its district Federal Reserve Bank.

Federal Reserve Banks obtain the notes from our Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP). It pays the BEP for the cost of producing the notes, which then become liabilities of the Federal Reserve Banks, and obligations of the United States Government.

Congress has specified that a Federal Reserve Bank must hold collateral equal in value to the Federal Reserve notes that the Bank receives. This collateral is chiefly gold certificates and United States securities. This provides backing for the note issue. The idea was that if the Congress dissolved the Federal Reserve System, the United States would take over the notes (liabilities). This would meet the requirements of Section 411, but the government would also take over the assets, which would be of equal value. Federal Reserve notes represent a first lien on all the assets of the Federal Reserve Banks, and on the collateral specifically held against them.

Federal Reserve notes are not redeemable in gold, silver or any other commodity, and receive no backing by anything This has been the case since 1933. The notes have no value for themselves, but for what they will buy. In another sense, because they are legal tender, Federal Reserve notes are “backed” by all the goods and services in the economy.

Now they, not you, have established that their confidence game, what you received in exchange for the company draft (check) was absolutely nothing. They are valueless so you exchanged your labor for valueless paper that has a lien on it already. They are identified in two statutes (Code) and they are Title 18 Section 8 where in it states

TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 1 > § 8 Release date: 2004-08-06

§ 8. Obligation or other security of the United States defined

The term “obligation or other security of the United States” includes all bonds, certificates of indebtedness, national bank currency, Federal Reserve notes, Federal Reserve bank notes, coupons, United States notes, Treasury notes, gold certificates, silver certificates, fractional notes, certificates of deposit, bills, checks, or drafts for money, drawn by or upon authorized officers of the United States, stamps and other representatives of value, of whatever denomination, issued under any Act of Congress, and canceled United States stamps.

And the second statute (Code) is



12 USC Sec. 411 01/23/00


Sec. 411. Issuance to reserve banks; nature of obligation;


Federal reserve notes, to be issued at the discretion of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for the purpose of
making advances to Federal reserve banks through the Federal
reserve agents as hereinafter set forth and for no other purpose,
are authorized. The said notes shall be obligations of the United
States and shall be receivable by all national and member banks and
Federal reserve banks and for all taxes, customs, and other public
dues. They shall be redeemed in lawful money on demand at the
Treasury Department of the United States, in the city of
Washington, District of Columbia, or at any Federal Reserve bank.

(Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, Sec. 16 (par.), 38 Stat. 265; Jan. 30, 1934,
ch. 6, Sec. 2(b)(1), 48 Stat. 337; Aug. 23, 1935, ch. 614, title
II, Sec. 203(a), 49 Stat. 704.)



Phrase ”hereinafter set forth” is from section 16 of the
Federal Reserve Act, act Dec. 23, 1913. Reference probably means as
set forth in sections 17 et seq. of the Federal Reserve Act. For
classification of these sections to the Code, see Tables.



Section is comprised of first par. of section 16 of act Dec. 23,
1913. Pars. 2 to 4, 5, and 6, 7, 8 to 11, 13 and 14 of section 16,
and pars. 15 to 18 of section 16 as added June 21, 1917, ch. 32,
Sec. 8, 40 Stat. 238, are classified to sections 412 to 414, 415,
416, 418 to 421, 360, 248-1, and 467, respectively, of this title.
Par. 12 of section 16, formerly classified to section 422 of this
title, was repealed by act June 26, 1934, ch. 756, Sec. 1, 48 Stat.



1934 – Act Jan. 30, 1934, struck out from last sentence provision
permitting redemption in gold.



Section 203(a) of act Aug. 23, 1935, changed name of Federal
Reserve Board to Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.



Gold coinage discontinued, see section 5112 of Title 31, Money
and Finance.

Since there is no more real “money” to be redeemed then as the Treasury Web Site stated they are worthless in conformity with 26 USC 165 (g). Ergo you cannot go into and bank and demand gold or silver coin for a federal reserve note.

So the question is, Have I received any income that is reportable for filing a tax form? Have I objected openly that I do not accept federal reserve notes as “payment” for my labor? See the PadleFord case 14 Ga. 438 wherein they stated,

“Supposing this not to be taxed for inspection purposes, has Congress consented to it being laid? It is certain that Congress has not expressly consented. But is express consent necessary? There is nothing in the Constitution which says so. There is nothing in the practice of men, or in the Municipal Law of men, or in the practice of nations, or the Law of nations that says so. Silence gives consent, is the rule of business life.
A tender of bills is as good as one of coin, unless the bills are objected to. To stand by, in silence, and see another sell your property, binds you. [Ok people how many times has your property (labor included) been stolen and turned over to the tax man in your silence? Did you file a refusal for good cause shown?] These are mere instances of the use of the maxim in the Municipal Law. In the Law of nations, it is equally potent. Silent acquiescence in the breach of a treaty binds a nation.(Vattel, ch. 16, sec.199, book 1. See book 2, sec. 142 et seq. as to usucaption and prescription, and sec. 208 as to ratification). Express consent, then, not being necessary, is there anything from which consent may be applied? There is–length of time.”

Has the company caused a theft when issuing you a draft that only will result in you receiving evidences of debt that are no longer “at Par” with a face value US Silver Eagle dollar denominated coin? This is what the court stated on this type money issue,

Westfall vs. Braley, 10 Ohio 188, 75 Am. Dec. 509;

Bank notes are the representative of money, and circulate as such, only by the general consent and usage of the community. But this consent and usage are based upon the convertibility of such notes into coin, at the pleasure of the holder, upon their presentation to the bank for redemption. This is the vital principle which sustains their character as money. So long as they are in fact what they purport to be, payable on demand, common consent gives them the ordinary attributes of money. But upon failure of the bank by which they are issued, when its doors are closed, and its inability to redeem its bills is openly avowed [See Letter, Oct. 26, 1989, Dept. of Treasury, Russell Munk, Asst. Gen. Council, (International Affairs) as recorded in the Office of the Clerk & Recorder, Bacca County, Colorado, admitting the notes are worthless and not redeemable at par.], they instantly lose the character of money, their circulation as currency ceases with the usage and consent upon which it rested, and the notes become the mere dishonored and depreciated evidences of debt . . . It is only upon this idea that they can honestly be tendered as money, and when accepted as such, under the same supposition, the mutual mistake of facts should no more be permitted to benefit one party, or prejudice the other, than if the notes had been spurious, or payment had been made in base or adulterated coin.”

Again the question begs of any court what the last sentence in that you have never received any income in “money”, but evidences of a debt issued with a lien already on it thereby taking them out of the realm of money as they are a debt obligation or in reality an I.O. U. issued by a private banking system that are trademarked as such.

Want more statutes and code on the matter for you to decide? Here is more info that is incontrovertible?

So with your question in mind as to what statutes say in regard to federal reserve
notes, read all of this

Sec. 5119.

Sec. 5119. – Redemption and cancellation of currency

(a) Except to the extent authorized in regulations the Secretary of the Treasury prescribes with the approval of the President, the Secretary may not redeem United States currency (including Federal reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks) in gold. However, the Secretary shall redeem gold certificates owned by the Federal reserve banks at times and in amounts the Secretary decides are necessary to maintain the equal purchasing power of each kind of United States currency. When redemption in gold is authorized, the redemption may be made only in gold bullion bearing the stamp of a United States mint or assay office in an amount equal at the time of redemption to the currency presented fo redemption.

COMMENT. As stated in the CODE, in red above, it can be taken as not being U.S currency like you say, until you read all the statutes and the words “IN KIND”. Then the worthless note IS taken as currency by the government. True, it is not a pay to, but only a legal offer (tender). That’s all they care about is a legal offer. You can decline a legal offer even if in federal reserve notes as stated on the US Treasury web site. Go back and read all of it if you have to.

(b) (1) Except as provided in subsection (c)(1) of this section,
the following are public debts bearing no interest:

(A) gold certificates issued before January 30, 1934.

(B) silver certificates.

(C) notes issued under the Act of July 14, 1890 (ch.
708, 26 Stat. 289).

(D) Federal Reserve notes for which payment was made under section 4 of the Old Series Currency Adjustment Act.

(E) United States currency notes, including those issued under section 1 of the Act of February 25, 1862 (ch. 33, 12 Stat. 345), the Act of July 11, 1862 (ch. 142, 12 Stat. 532), the resolution of January 17, 1863 (P.R. 9; 12 Stat. 822), section 2 of the Act of March 3, 1863 (ch. 73, 12 Stat. 710), or section 5115 of this title.

(2) Redemption, cancellation, and destruction of currency. –

The Secretary shall –

(A) redeem any currency described in paragraph (1) from the general fund of the Treasury upon presentment to the Secretary; and

(B) cancel and destroy such currency upon redemption.

The Secretary shall not be required to reissue United States currency notes upon redemption.

(c) (1) The Secretary may determine the amount of the following United States currency that will not be presented for redemption because the currency has been destroyed or irretrievably lost:

(A) circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks issued before July 1, 1929, for which the United States Government has assumed liability.

COMMENT. Does this mean that the notes are no longer assumed by the United States? Kinda presumes they are assumed by the IMF/fed. Res. that issues them as first liens on the U.S., huh?

(B) outstanding currency referred to in subsection (b)(1) of this section.

(2) When the Secretary makes a determination under this subsection, the Secretary shall reduce the amount of that currency outstanding by the amount the Secretary determines will not be redeemed and credit the appropriate receipt account.

(d) To provide a historical collection of United States currency, the Secretary may withhold from cancellation and destruction and transfer to a special account one piece of each design, issue, or series of each denomination of each kind of currency (including circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks) after redemption. The Secretary may make appropriate entries in Treasury accounts because of the transfers

Here are the actual statutes on the above that you wanted.

Notes on Sec. 5119.

Pub. L. 97-258, Sept. 13, 1982, 96 Stat. 985
Pub. L. 102-390, title II, Sec. 226(b), Oct. 6, 1992, 106 Stat. 1630
Pub. L. 103-325, title VI, Sec. 602(g)(14), Sept. 23, 1994, 108 Stat. 2294.

Historical and Revision Notes Revised Section
Source (U.S. Code) Source (Statutes at Large)

5119(a) 31:408a(less last proviso). 31:444(1st sentence words between 2d and 3d semicolons). 31:822b. Jan. 30, 1934, ch. 6, Sec. 6(less last proviso), 11, 15(1st sentence words between 2d and 3d semicolons), 48 Stat. 340, 342, 344. 5119(b)(1) 31:405a-3. 31:911. 31:915(a), (b). June 24, 1967, Pub. L. 90-29, Sec. 1, 2, 81 Stat. 77. June 30, 1961, Pub. L. 87-66, Sec. 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 75 Stat. 146, 147.

5119(b)(2) 31:404. 31:420. 31:914. 31:916. May 31, 1878, ch. 146, 20 Stat. 87; June 30, 1961, Pub. L. 87-66, Sec. 7, 75 Stat. 47. R.S. Sec. 3580.

5119(c)(1) 31:915(c)(words before last comma).

5119(c)(2) 31:405a-2. 31:915(c)(words after last comma).

5119(d) 31:917. In subsection (a), the words ”Secretary may not redeem” are substituted for
”no . . . shall be redeemed” in 31:408a(less last proviso) because of the source provisions restated in section 321 of the revised title. The words ”United States currency (including Federal reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks)” are substituted
for ”currency of the United States” and the text of 31:444(1st sentence words between 2d and 3d semicolons) for consistency with section 5103 of this title and to eliminate unnecessary words.

COMMENT. Can’t be any plainer than this, right?
In subsection (b)(1), before clause (A), the words ”upon completion of the transfers and credits authorized and directed by section 912 of this title” in 31:915 and ”and the amount of the payment credited as a public debt receipt in accordance with such section” are omitted as executed. In clause (B), the text of 31:405a-3(last sentence) and 31:915(a)(4) is consolidated. The text of 31:405a-3(1st sentence) is omitted as executed. In clauses (C) and (E), the citations in parentheses are included only for information purposes.

In subsection (b)(2), the words ”cancel and destroy” are substituted for
‘retired” in 31:914 for consistency in the revised section. The words ”paragraph (1)
of this subsection” are substituted for ”Any currency the funds for the redemption
or security of which have been transferred pursuant to the provisions of section 912
of this title, and any Federal Reserve notes as to which payment has been made
under section 913 of this title” because of the restatement. The words ”presented
to the Secretary” are substituted for ”presentation at the Treasury” because of the
source provisions restated in section 321(c) of the revised title. The text of 31:916 is
omitted as unnecessary because of the restatement. The text of 31:404 and 31:420
is omitted as superseded by the source provisions restated in this subsection and
subsection (c). The words ”All acts and parts of acts in conflict herewith are hereby
repealed” in the Act of May 31, 1878 (ch. 146, 20 Stat. 87), are omitted as

In subsection (c)(2), the words ”When the Secretary makes a determination
under this subsection” are added because of the restatement. The words ”on the
books of the Treasury” are omitted as surplus.
The text of 31:405(e)(2)(1st sentence) is omitted as superseded by the source
provisions restated in subsection (b).

In subsection (d), the word ”paper” is omitted as surplus. The words
”(including circulating notes of Federal Reserve banks and national banks)” are
substituted for ”including bank notes” for consistency in the section. The words
”heretofore or hereafter issued” are omitted as surplus


Act of July 14, 1890, ch. 708, 26 Stat. 289, referred to in subsec. (b)(1)(C),
which was known as the Sherman Purchase of Silver Act of July 14, 1890, was
classified to sections 408, 410, 412, and 453 of former Title 31, and sections 122
and 145 of Title 12, Banks and Banking, and was repealed by Pub. L. 97-258,
Sec. 5(b), Sept. 13, 1982, 96 Stat. 1069.

Section 4 of the Old Series Currency Adjustment Act, referred to in subsec.
(b)(1)(D), is section 4 of Pub. L. 87-66, June 30, 1961, 75 Stat. 146, which was
classified to section 913 of former Title 31, and was repealed by Pub. L. 97-258,
Sec. 5(b), Sept. 13, 1982, 96 Stat. 1079.

Acts February 25, 1862, July 11, 1862, and March 3, 1863, and resolution
January 17, 1863, referred to in subsec. (b)(1)(E), are acts Feb. 25, 1862, ch. 33,
12 Stat. 345, July 11, 1862, ch. 142, 12 Stat. 532, and Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 73, 12
Stat. 709, and resolution Jan. 17, 1863, 12 Stat. 822, respectively, which are not
classified to the Code

1994 – Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 103-325 inserted concluding provisions. 1992 –
Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 102-390 amended par. (2) generally. Prior to amendment,
par. (2) read as follows: ”The Secretary shall redeem from the general fund of the
Treasury and cancel and destroy currency referred to in paragraph (1) of this
subsection when the currency is presented to the Secretary.”

Now let’s go here
Sec. 5103.

Sec. 5103. – Legal tender

United States coins and currency (including Federal reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks) are legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues. Foreign gold or silver coins are not legal tender for debts

Now here is something people do not know in the notes which I will put in


Notes on Sec. 5103.

Pub. L. 97-258, Sept. 13, 1982, 96 Stat. 980
Pub. L. 97-452, Sec. 1(19), Jan. 12, 1983, 96 Stat. 2477.

Historical and Revision Notes 1982 Act

Revised Section Source (U.S. Code) Source (Statutes at Large)
5103 31:392. 31:456. July 23, 1965, Pub. L. 89-81, Sec. 102, 79 Stat. 255. R.S.
Sec. 3584.

The words ”All . . . regardless of when coined or issued” are omitted as
unnecessary because of the restatement. The word ”debts” is substituted for
”debts, public and private” to eliminate unnecessary words. The words ”public
charges, taxes, duties, and dues” are omitted as included in ”debts”

1983 ACT
This restores to 31:5103 the reference to public charges, taxes, and dues because
they are not considered to be debts. See, Hagar v. Reclamation District No. 108,
111 U.S. 701, 706 (1884).

1983 – Pub. L. 97-452 inserted ”, public charges, taxes, and dues” after ”all debts”.


Amendment effective Sept. 13, 1982, see section 2(i) of Pub. L. 97-452, set
out as a note under section 3331 of this title

This section is referred to in sections 5112, 5132 of this title.

Now as to taxation of these “notes” and coin read this.
Sec. 5154.

Sec. 5154. – State taxation

A State or a territory or possession of the United States may tax United States coins and currency (including Federal reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks) as money on hand or on deposit in the same way and at the same rate that the State, territory, or possession taxes other forms of money. This section does not affect a law taxing national banks

Here are the statutes for the above and are you ready for this? Read on

Notes on Sec. 5154.

Pub. L. 97-258, Sept. 13, 1982, 96 Stat. 992
Pub. L. 97-452, Sec. 1(22), Jan. 12, 1983, 96 Stat. 2477.

Historical and Revision Notes 1982 Act

Revised Section Source (U.S. Code) Source (Statutes at Large)
5154 31:425, 426. Aug. 13, 1894, ch. 281, 28 Stat. 278.

The words ”United States coins and currency (including Federal reserve notes
and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks)” are substituted for
”Circulating notes of national banking associations and United States legal tender notes and other notes and certificates of the United States payable on demand and circulating or intended to circulate as currency and gold, silver, or other coin” in 31:425 to eliminate unnecessary words and for consistency with section 5103 of the revised title

1983 ACT
This restates 31:5154 to clarify the intent of the section. See 26 Cong. Rec. 7152, 7170 (1894).

1983 – Pub. L. 97-452 substituted ”other forms of money” for ”United States coins and currency circulating within its jurisdiction”.


Amendment effective Sept. 13, 1982, see section 2(i) of Pub. L. 97-452, set out as a note
under section 3331 of this title

So I think you have enough statutes you wanted to show that federal reserve notes, although worthless, ARE considered to be legal tender (offer) as currency of the United States. The key in all the above relies on that “restatement” of law. Best to get it and read what they had to say about currency and the worthless note.

Now, were you ever “paid” in “money” or evidences of debt? Is that reportable and income when there is no worth attached as stated in Title 26 USC 165 (g) and in the U.S. Treasury Web site quoted above plus all the other sources including the court cases? Would it not be feasible to bring this argument in the administrative forum rather than wait for your butt to be dragged into their court where you will never be allowed to present this as evidence? Better to get it on the administrative record as NOT your argument, but their proofs you have no income with which requires you to file any IRS form whatsoever. Says so right on your master file in a code that is theirs, not yours. After all you are hitting them with their own admissions. Never put -0- income on any 1040 or you will have defeated this plain proof that you have no reportable income.. Now you know why the IRS considers your labor value as -0- and anything above that is pure profit to you. Never thought of it that way did you? Well, when is the onslaught gonna happen? Don’t take my word for this, read it for yourself and draw your own conclusions from the very statutes I gave you here. This ought to really put the binders on them for a long time once you people see the truth they place before you every day.

Peace be with you

The Informer



Patronymic Paralogy

May 16, 2017

Patronymic Paralogy
Your Name Under Their Law – 137 pages

The United States Citizen General immunities pertaining to prosecutors, judges and government agents
Prosecutor may violate civil rights
in initiating prosecution and presenting case.
– United States Supreme Court in
Imbler v. Pachtman
424 U.S.
409 (1976)
Immunity extends to all activities closely associated with litigation or potential
– Second Circuit Federal Court of Appeal in
Davis v. Grusemever, 996 F.2d 617
Prosecutor may knowingly use false testimony and suppress evidence. – United
States Supreme Court in
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)
Prosecutor may file charges without any investigation.
– Eighth Circuit Federal Court of Appeal in
Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1337 (1986)
Prosecutor may file charges outside of his jurisdiction.
– Eighth Circuit Federal Court of appeal in
Myers v. Morris, 840 F.2d 1337 (1986)
Prosecutor may knowingly offer perjured testimony.
– Ninth Circuit Federal Court of Appeal in
Jones v. Shankland, 800 F.2d 1310
Prosecutor can suppress exculpatory evidence. (Exculpatory defined: Evidence
showing one innocent)
– Fifth Circuit Federal Court of Appeal in
Henzel v. Gertstein, 608 F.2d 654 (1979)

Prosecutors are immune from lawsuit for conspiring
with judges to determine
outcome of judicial proceedings.
– Ninth Circuit Federal Court of Appeal in
Ashelman v. Pope, 793 E.2d 1072 (1986)
Prosecutor may knowingly file charges against innocent persons for a crime that
never occurred.
– Tenth Circuit Federal Court of Appeal in
Norton v. Liddell, 620 F.2d 1375 (1980)
Ignorantia juris non excusat or
Ignorantia legis neminem excusat
(Latin for
“ignorance of the law does not excuse” or “ignorance of the law excuses no one”) is a
legal principle holding that a person who is unaware of a law may not escape liability for
violating that law merely because he or she was unaware of its content.

Sovereigns Rights Superior Over Citizens

May 9, 2017

“Ye Can Be As Gods”.. Thats what Nation state builders owners do, play god..

§ 38. Of the sovereign.

THE reader cannot expect to find here a long deduction of the rights of sovereignty, and the functions of a prince. These are to be found in treatises on the public law. In this chapter we only propose to show, in consequence of the grand principles of the law of nations, what a sovereign is, and to give a general idea of his obligations and his rights.

We have said that the sovereignty is that public authority which commands in civil society, and orders and directs what each citizen is to perform, to obtain the end of its institution. This authority originally and essentially belonged to the body of the society, to which each member submitted, and ceded his natural right of conducting himself in every thing as he pleased, according to the dictates of his own understanding, and of doing himself justice. But the body of the society does not always retain in its own hands this sovereign authority: it frequently intrusts it to a senate, or to a single person. That senate, or that person, is then the sovereign.
§ 39. It is solely established for thesafety and advantage of society.

It is evident that men form a political society, and submit to laws, solely for their own advantage and safety. The sovereign authority is then established only for the common good of all the citizens; and it would be absurd to think that it could change its nature on passing into the hands of a senate or a monarch. Flattery, therefore, cannot, without rendering itself equally ridiculous and odious, deny that the sovereign is only established for the safety and advantage of society.

A good prince, a wise conductor of society, ought to have his mind impressed with this great truth, that the sovereign power is solely intrusted to him for the safety of the state, and the happiness of all the people; that he is not permitted to consider himself as the principal object in the administration of affairs, to seek his own satisfaction, or his private advantage; but that he ought to direct all his views, all his steps, to the greatest advantage of the state and people who have submitted to him.1 What a noble sight it is to see a king of England rendering his parliament an account of his principal operations — assuring that body, the representatives of the nation, that he has no other end in view than the glory of the state and the happiness of his people — and affectionately thanking all who concur with him in such salutary views! Certainly, a monarch who makes use of this language, and by his conduct proves the sincerity of his professions, is, in the opinion of the wise, the only great man. But, in most kingdoms, a criminal flattery has long since caused these maxims to be forgotten. A crowd of servile courtiers easily persuade a proud monarch that the nation was made for him, and not he for the nation. He soon considers the kingdom as a patrimony that is his own property, and his people as a herd of cattle from which he is to derive his wealth, and which he may dispose of to answer his own views, and gratify his passions. Hence those fatal wars undertaken by ambition, restlessness, hatred, and pride; — hence those oppressive taxes, whose produce is dissipated by ruinous luxury, or squandered upon mistresses and favourites; — hence, in fine, are important posts given by favour, while public merit is neglected, and every thing that does not immediately interest the prince is abandoned to ministers and subalterns. Who can, in this unhappy government, discover an authority established for the public welfare? A great prince will be on his guard even against his virtues.

Let us not say, with some writers, that private virtues are not the virtues of kings — a maxim of superficial politicians, or of those who are very inaccurate in their expressions. Goodness, friendship, gratitude, are still virtues on the throne; and would to God they were always to be found there! But a wise king does not yield an undiscerning obedience to their impulse. He cherishes them, he cultivates them in his private life; but in state affairs he listens only to justice and sound policy. And why? because he knows that the government was intrusted to him only for the happiness of society, and that, therefore, he ought not to consult his own pleasure in the use he makes of his power. He tempers his goodness with wisdom; he gives to friendship his domestic and private favours; he distributes posts and employments according to merit; public rewards to services done to the state. In a word, he uses the public power only with a view to the public welfare. All this is comprehended in that fine saying of Lewis XII.: — “A king of France does not revenge the injuries of a duke of Orleans.”
§ 40. Of his representative character.

A political society is a moral person (Prelim. § 2) inasmuch as it has an understanding and a will, of which it makes use for the conduct of its affairs, and is capable of obligations and rights. When, therefore, a people confer the sovereignty on any one person, they invest him with their understanding and will, and make over to him their obligations and rights, so far as relates to the administration of the state, and to the exercise of the public authority. The sovereign, or conductor of the state, thus becoming the depositary of the obligations and rights relative to government, in him is found the moral person, who, without absolutely ceasing to exist in the nation, acts thenceforwards only in him and by him. Such is the origin of the representative character attributed to the sovereign. He represents the nation in all the affairs in which he may happen to be engaged as a sovereign. It does not debase the dignity of the greatest monarch to attribute to him this representative character; on the contrary, nothing sheds a greater lustre on it, since the monarch thus unites in his own person all the majesty that belongs to the entire body of the nation.
§ 41. He is intrusted with the obligations of the nation, and invested with its rights.

The sovereign, thus clothed with the public authority, with every thing that constitutes the moral personality of the nation, of course becomes bound by the obligations of that nation, and invested with its rights.
§ 42 His duty with respect to the preservation and perfection of the nation.

All that has been said in Chap. II. of the general duties of a nation towards itself particularly regards the sovereign. He is the depositary of the empire, and the power of commanding whatever conduces to the public welfare; he ought, therefore, as a tender and wise father, and as a faithful administrator, to watch for the nation, and take care to preserve it, and render it more perfect; to better its state, and to secure it, as far as possible, against every thing that threatens its safety or its happiness.
§ 43. His rights in this respect.

Hence all the rights which a nation derives from its obligation to preserve and perfect itself, and to improve its state, (see §§ 18, 20, and 23, of this book); all these rights, I say, reside in the sovereign, who is therefore indifferently called the conductor of the society, superior, prince, &c.
§ 44. He ought to know the nation.

We have observed above, that every nation ought to know itself. This obligation devolves on the sovereign, since it is he who is to watch over the preservation and perfection of the nation. The duty which the law of nature here imposes on the conductors of nations is of extreme importance, and of considerable extent. They ought exactly to know the whole country subject to their authority; its qualities, defects, advantages, and situation with regard to the neighbouring states; and they ought to acquire a perfect knowledge of the manners and general inclinations of their people, their virtues, vices, talents, &c. All these branches of knowledge are necessary to enable them to govern properly.
§ 45. The extent of his power.

The prince derives his authority from the nation; he possesses just so much of it as they have thought proper to intrust him with. If the nation has plainly and simply invested him with the sovereignty, without limitation or division, he is supposed to be invested with all the prerogatives, without which the sovereign command or authority could not be exerted in the manner most conducive to the public welfare. These are called regal prerogatives, or the prerogatives of majesty.
§ 46. The prince ought to respect and support the fundamental laws.

But when the sovereign power is limited and regulated by the fundamental laws of the state, those laws show the prince the extent and bounds of his power, and the manner in which he is to exert it. The prince is therefore strictly obliged not only to respect, but also to support them. The constitution and the fundamental laws are the plan on which the nation has resolved to labour for the attainment of happiness; the execution is intrusted to the prince. Let him religiously follow this plan; let him consider the fundamental laws as inviolable and sacred rules; and remember that the moment he deviates from them, his commands become unjust, and are but a criminal abuse of the power with which he is intrusted. He is, by virtue of that power, the guardian and defender of the laws: and while it is his duty to restrain each daring violator of them, ought he himself to trample them under foot?2
§ 47. He may change the laws not fundamental.

If the prince be invested with the legislative power, he may, according to his wisdom, and when the public advantage requires it, abolish those laws that are not fundamental, and make now ones. (See what we have said on this subject in the preceding chapter, § 34.)
§ 48. He ought to maintain and observe the existing laws.

But while these laws exist, the sovereign ought religiously to maintain and observe them. They are the foundation of the public tranquility, and the firmest support of the sovereign authority. Every thing is uncertain, violent, and subject to revolutions, in those unhappy states where arbitrary power has placed her throne. It is therefore the true interest of the prince, as well as his duty, to maintain and respect the laws; he ought to submit to them himself. We find this truth established in a piece published by order of Lewis XIV., one of the most absolute princes that ever reigned in Europe. “Let it not be said that the sovereign is not subject to the laws of his state, since the contrary proposition is one of the truths of the law of nations, which flattery has sometimes attacked, and which good princes have always defended, as a tutelar divinity of their states.”3
§ 49. In what sense he is subject to the laws.

But it is necessary to explain this submission of the prince to the laws. First, he ought, as we have just seen, to follow their regulations in all the acts of his administration. In the second place, he is himself subject, in his private affairs, to all the laws that relate to property. I say, “in his private affairs;” for when he acts as a sovereign prince, and in the name of the state, he is subject only to the fundamental laws, and the law of nations. In the third place, the prince is subject to certain regulations of general polity, considered by the state as inviolable, unless he be excepted in express terms by the law, or tacitly by a necessary consequence of his dignity. I here speak of the laws that relate to the situation of individuals, and particularly of those that regulate the validity of marriages. These laws are established to ascertain the state of families: now the royal family is that of all others the most important to be certainly known. But, fourthly, we shall observe in general, with respect to this question, that, if the prince is invested with a full, absolute, and unlimited sovereignty, he is above the laws, which derive from him all their force; and he may dispense with his own observance of them, whenever natural justice and equity will permit him. Fifthly, as to the laws relative to morals and good order, the prince ought doubtless to respect them, and to support them by his example. But, sixthly, he is certainly above all civil penal laws, The majesty of a sovereign will not admit of his being punished like a private person; and his functions are too exalted to allow of his being molested under pretence of a fault that does not directly concern the government of the state.
§ 50. His person is sacred and inviolable.

It is not sufficient that the prince be above the penal laws: even the interest of nations requires that we should go something farther. The sovereign is the soul of the society; if he be not held in veneration by the people, and in perfect security, the public peace, and the happiness and safety of the state, are in continual danger. The safety of the nation then necessarily requires that the person of the prince be sacred and inviolable. The Roman people bestowed this privilege on their tribunes, in order that they might meet with no obstruction in defending them, and that no apprehension might disturb them in the discharge of their office. The cares, the employments of a sovereign, are of much greater importance than those of the tribunes were, and not less dangerous, if he be not provided with a powerful defence. It is impossible even for the most just and wise monarch not to make malcontents; and ought the state to continue exposed to the danger of losing so valuable a prince by the hand of an assassin? The monstrous and absurd doctrine, that a private person is permitted to kill a bad prince, deprived the French, in the beginning of the last century, of a hero who was truly the father of his people.4 Whatever a prince may be, it is an enormous crime against a nation to deprive them of a sovereign whom they think proper to obey.5
§ 51. But the nation may curb a tyrant, and withdraw itself from his obedience.

But this high attribute of sovereignty is no reason why the nation should not curb an insupportable tyrant, pronounce sentence on him (still respecting in his person the majesty of his rank) and withdraw itself from his obedience. To this indisputable right a powerful republic owes its birth. The tyranny exercised by Philip II. in the Netherlands excited those provinces to rise: seven of them, closely confederated, bravely maintained their liberties, under the conduct of the heroes of the House of Orange; and Spain, after several vain and ruinous efforts, acknowledged them sovereign and independent states. If the authority of the prince is limited and regulated by the fundamental laws, the prince, on exceeding the bounds prescribed him, commands without any right and even without a just title: the nation is not obliged to obey him, but may resist his unjust attempts. As soon as a prince attacks the constitution of the state, he breaks the contract which bound the people to him; the people become free by the act of the sovereign, and can no longer view him but as a usurper who would load them with oppression. This truth is acknowledged by every sensible writer, whose pen is not enslaved by fear, or sold for hire. But some celebrated authors maintain, that if the prince is invested with the supreme command in a full and absolute manner, nobody has a right to resist him, much less to curb him, and that naught remains for the nation but to suffer and obey with patience. This is founded upon the supposition that such a sovereign is not accountable to any person for the manner in which he governs, and that if the nation might control his actions and resist him where it thinks them unjust, his authority would no longer be absolute; which would be contrary to this hypothesis. They say that an absolute sovereign completely possesses all the political authority of the society, which nobody can oppose; that, if he abuses it, he does ill indeed, and wounds his conscience; but that his commands are not the less obligatory, as being founded on a lawful right to command; that the nation, by giving him absolute authority, has reserved no share of it to itself, and has submitted to his discretion, &c. We might be content with answering, that in this light there is not any sovereign who is completely and fully absolute. But in order to remove all these vain subtleties, let us remember the essential end of civil society. Is it not to labour in concert for the common happiness of all? Was it not with this view that every citizen divested himself of his rights, and resigned his liberty? Could the society make such use of its authority as irrevocably to surrender itself and all its members to the discretion of a cruel tyrant? No, certainly, since it would no longer possess any right itself, if it were disposed to oppress a part of the citizens. When, therefore, it confers the supreme and absolute government, without an express reserve, it is necessarily with the tacit reserve that the sovereign shall use it for the safety of the people, and not for their ruin. If he becomes the scourge of the state, he degrades himself; he is no better than a public enemy, against whom the nation may and ought to defend itself; and if he has carried his tyranny to the utmost height, why should even the life of so cruel and perfidious an enemy be spared? Who shall presume to blame the conduct of the Roman senate, that declared Nero an enemy to his country?

But it is of the utmost importance to observe, that this judgment can only be passed by the nation, or by a body which represents it, and that the nation itself cannot make any attempt on the person of the sovereign, except in cases of extreme necessity, and when the prince, by violating the laws, and threatening the safety of his people, puts himself in a state of war against them. It is the person of the sovereign, not that of an unnatural tyrant and a public enemy, that the interest of the nation declares sacred and inviolable. We seldom see such monsters as Nero. In the more common cases, when a prince violates the fundamental laws; when he attacks the liberties and privileges of his subjects; or (if he be absolute) when his government, without being carried to extreme violence, manifestly tends to the ruin of the nation; it may resist him, pass sentence on him, and withdraw from his obedience; but though this may be done, still his person should be spared, and that for the welfare of the state.5 It is above a century since the English took up arms against their king, and obliged him to descend from the throne. A set of able, enterprising men, spurred on by ambition, took advantage of the terrible ferment caused by fanaticism and party spirit; and Great Britain suffered her sovereign to die unworthily on a scaffold. The nation coming to itself discovered its former blindness. If, to this day, it still annually makes a solemn atonement, it is not only from the opinion that the unfortunate Charles I. did not deserve so cruel a fate, but, doubtless, from a conviction that the very safety of the state requires the person of the sovereign to be held sacred and inviolable, and that the whole nation ought to render this maxim venerable, by paying respect to it when the care of its own preservation will permit.

One word more on the distinction that is endeavoured to be made here in favour of an absolute sovereign. Whoever has well weighed the force of the indisputable principles we have established, will be convinced, that when it is necessary to resist a prince who has become a tyrant, the right of the people is still the same, whether that prince was made absolute by the laws, or was not; because that right is derived from what is the object of all political society — the safety of the nation, which is the supreme law.6 But, if the distinction of which we are treating is of no moment with respect to the right, it can be of none in practice, with respect to expediency. As it is very difficult to oppose an absolute prince, and it cannot be done without raising great disturbances in the state, and the most violent and dangerous commotions, it ought to be attempted only in cases of extremity, when the public miseries are raised to such a height that the people may say with Tacitus, miseram pacem vel bello bene niutari, that it is better to expose themselves to a civil war than to endure them. But if the prince’s authority is limited, if it in some respects depends on a senate, or a parliament that represents the nation, there are means of resisting and curbing him, without exposing the state to violent shocks. When mild and innocent remedies can be applied to the evil, there can be no reason for waiting until it becomes extreme.
§ 52. Arbitration between the king and his subjects.

But however limited a prince’s authority may be, he is commonly very jealous of it; it seldom happens that he patiently suffers resistance, and peaceably submits to the judgement of his people. Can he want support, while he is the distributor of favours? We see too many base and ambitious souls, for whom the state of a rich and decorated slave has more charms than that of a modest and virtuous citizen. It is therefore always difficult for a nation to resist a prince and pronounce sentence on his conduct, without exposing the state to dangerous troubles, and to shocks capable of overturning it. This has sometimes occasioned a compromise between the prince and the subjects, to submit to the decision of a friendly power all the disputes that might arise between them. Thus the kings of Denmark, by solemn treaties, formerly referred to those of Sweden the differences that might arise between them and their senate; and this the kings of Sweden have also done with regard to those of Denmark. The princes and states of West Friesland, and the burgesses of Embden, have in the same manner constituted the republic of the United Provinces the judge of their differences. The princes and the city of Neufchatel established, in 1406, the canton of Berne perpetual judge and arbitrator of their disputes. Thus also, according to the spirit of the Helvetic confederacy, the entire body takes cognisance of the disturbances that arise in any of the confederated states, though each of them is truly sovereign and independent.
§ 53. The obedience which subjects owe to a sovereign.

As soon as a nation acknowledges a prince for its lawful sovereign, all the citizens owe him a faithful obedience. He can neither govern the state, nor perform what the nation expects from him, if he be not punctually obeyed. Subjects then have no right, in doubtful cases, to examine the wisdom or justice of their sovereign’s commands; this examination belongs to the prince: his subjects ought to suppose (if there be a possibility of supposing it) that all his orders are just and salutary: he alone is accountable for the evil that may result from them.
§ 54. In what cases they may resist him.

Nevertheless this ought not to be entirely a blind obedience. No engagement can oblige, or even authorize, a man to violate the law of nature. All authors who have any regard to conscience or decency agree that no one ought to obey such commands as are evidently contrary to that sacred law. Those governors of places who bravely refused to execute the barbarous orders of Charles IX. on the memorable day of St. Bartholomew, have been universally praised; and the court did not dare to punish them, at least openly. “Sire,” said the brave Orte, governor of Bayonne, in his letter, “I have communicated your majesty’s command to your faithful inhabitants and warriors in the garrison; and I have found there only good citizens and brave soldiers, but not a single executioner: wherefore both they and I most humbly entreat your majesty to be pleased to employ our hands and our lives in things that are possible, however hazardous they may be; and we will exert ourselves to the last drop of our blood in the execution of them.”7 The Count de Tende, Charny, and others, replied to those who brought them the orders of the court, “that they had too great a respect for the king, to believe that such barbarous orders came from him.”

It is more difficult to determine in what cases a subject may not only refuse to obey, but even resist a sovereign, and oppose his violence by force. When a sovereign does injury to any one, he acts without any real authority; but we ought not thence to conclude hastily that the subject may resist him. The nature of sovereignty, and the welfare of the state, will not permit citizens to oppose a prince whenever his commands appear to them unjust or prejudicial. This would be falling back into the state of nature, and rendering government impossible. A subject ought patiently to suffer from the prince doubtful wrongs, and wrongs that are supportable; the former, because whoever has submitted to the decision of a judge, is no longer capable of deciding his own pretensions; and as to those that are supportable, they ought to be sacrificed to the peace and safety of the state, on account of the great advantages obtained by living in society. It is presumed, as matter of course, that every citizen has tacitly engaged to observe this moderation; because, without it, society could not exist. But when the injuries are manifest and atrocious, — when a prince, without any apparent reason attempts to deprive us of life, or of those things the loss of which would render life irksome, who can dispute our right to resist him? Self-preservation is not only a natural right, but an obligation imposed by nature, and no man can entirely and absolutely renounce it. And though he might give it up, can he be considered as having done it by his political engagements since he entered into society only to establish his own safety upon a more solid basis? The welfare of society does not require such a sacrifice; and, as Barbeyrac well observes in his notes on Grotius, “If the public interest requires that those who obey should suffer some inconvenience, it is no less for the public interest that those who command should be afraid of driving their patience to the utmost extremity.”8 The prince who violates all laws, who no longer observes any measures, and who would in his transports of fury take away the life of an innocent person, divests himself of his character, and is no longer to be considered in any other light than that of an unjust and outrageous enemy, against whom his people are allowed to defend themselves. The person of the sovereign is sacred and inviolable: but he who, after having lost all the sentiments of a sovereign, divests himself even of the appearances and exterior conduct of a monarch, degrades himself: he no longer retains the sacred character of a sovereign, and cannot retain the prerogatives attached to that exalted rank. However, if this prince is not a monster, — if he is furious only against us in particular, and from the effects of a sudden transport or a violent passion, and is supportable to the rest of the nation, the respect we ought to pay to the tranquility of the state is such, and the respect due to sovereign majesty so powerful, that we are strictly obliged to seek every other means of preservation, rather than to put his person in danger. Every one knows the example set by David: he fled, — he kept himself concealed, to secure himself from Saul’s fury, and more than once spared the life of his persecutor. When the reason of Charles VI. of France was suddenly disordered by a fatal accident, he in his fury killed several of those who surrounded him: none of them thought of securing his own life at the expense of that of the king; they only endeavoured to disarm and secure him. They did their duty like men of honour and faithful subjects, in exposing their lives to save that of this unfortunate monarch: such a sacrifice is due to the state and to sovereign majesty: furious from the derangement of his faculties, Charles was not guilty: he might recover his health, and again become a good king.
§ 55. Of ministers.

What has been said is sufficient for the intention of this work: the reader may see these questions treated more at large in many books that are well known. We shall conclude this subject with an important observation. A sovereign is undoubtedly allowed to employ ministers to ease him in the painful offices of government; but he ought never to surrender his authority to them. When a nation chooses a conductor, it is not with a view that he should deliver up his charge into other hands. Ministers ought only to be instruments in the hands of the prince; he ought constantly to direct them, and continually endeavour to know whether they act according to his intentions. If the imbecility of age. or any infirmity, render him incapable of governing, a regent ought to be nominated, according to the laws of the state: but when once the sovereign is capable of holding the reins, let him insist on being served, but never suffer himself to be superseded. The last kings of France of the first race surrendered to government and authority to the mayors of the palace: thus becoming mere phantoms, they justly lost the title and honours of a dignity of which they had abandoned the functions. The nation has every thing to gain in crowning an all-powerful minister, for he will improve that soil as his own inheritance, which he plundered whilst he only reaped precarious advantages from it.

1. The last words of Louis VI. to his son Louis VII. were — “Remember, my son, that royalty is but a public employment of which you must render a rigorous account to him who is the sole disposer of crowns and sceptres,” Abbe Velley’s Hist. of France, Vol. III. p. 65.

Timur-Bec declared (as he often before had done on similar occasions) that “a single hour’s attention devoted by a prince to the care of his state, is of more use and consequence than all the homage and prayers he could offer up to God during his whole life.” The same sentiment is found in the Koran. Hist. of Timur-Bec, Book II. ch. xli.

2. Neque enim se princeps reipulicae et singulorum dominum arbitrabitur, quamvis assentatoribus id in aurem insusurrantibus, sed rectorem mercede a civibus designata, quam augere, nisi ipsis volentibus, nefas existimabit. Ibid. c. v. — From this principle it follows that the nation is superior to the sovereign. Quod caput est, sit principi persuasum totius reipulicae majorem quam ipsius unius auctoritatem esse: neque pessimis hominibus credat diversum affirmantibus gratificandi studio; quae magna pernicies est. Ibid.

In some countries, formal precautions are taken against the abuse of power. — “Reflecting among other things (says Grotius), that princes are often found to make no scruple of violating their promises under the state pretext of the public good, the people of Brabant, in order to obviate that inconvenience, established the custom of never admitting their prince to the possession of the government without having previously made with him a covenant, that, whenever he may happen to violate the laws of the country, they shall be absolved from the oath of obedience they had sworn to him, until ample reparation be made for the outrages committed. The truth of this is confirmed by the example of past generations, who formerly made effectual use of arms and decrees to reduce within proper bounds such of their sovereigns as had transgressed the line of duty, whether through their own licentiousness or the artifices of their flatterers. Thus it happened to John the Second; nor would they consent to make peace with him or his successors, until those princes had entered into a solemn engagement to secure the citizens in the enjoyment of their privileges.” Annals of the Netherlands, Book II. note, edit A.D. 1797.

3. A treatise on the right of the queen to several states of the Spanish monarchy, 1667, in 12 mo. Part II. p. 191.

4. Since the above was written, France has witnessed a renewal of those horrors. She sighs at the idea of having given birth to a monster capable of violating the majesty of kings in the person of a prince, whom the qualities of his heart entitle to the love of his subjects and the veneration of foreigners. [The author alludes to the attempt made by Damien to assassinate Louis XV.] Note, edit a.d. 1797.

5. In Mariana’s work, above quoted, I find (chap. vii. towards the end) a remarkable instance of the errors into which we are apt to be led by a subtle sophistry destitute of sound principles. That author allows us to poison a tyrant, and even a public enemy, provided it be done without obliging him, either by force or through mistake or ignorance, to concur in the act that causes his own death, — which would be the case, for instance, in presenting him a poisoned draught. For (says he), in thus leading him to an act of suicide, although committed through ignorance, we make him violate the natural law which forbids each individual to lake away his own life; and the crime of him who thus unknowingly poisons himself redounds on the real author, — the person who administered the poison. — No cogatur tantum sciens aut imprudens sibi conscire mortem; quod esse nefas judicamus, veneno in potu aut cibo, quod hauriat qui perimendus est, aut simili alia retemperato. A fine reason, truly! Was Mariana disposed to insult the understandings of his readers, or only desirous of throwing a slight varnish over the detestable doctrine contained in that chapter? — Note, edit. A.D. 1797.

5. Dissimulandum censeo quatenus salus publica patiatur, privatimque corruptis moribus princeps continagat; alioquin si rempublicam in periculum vocat, si patriae religionis contemptor existit, neque mediciniam ullam recipit, abdicandum judico, alium substituendum; quod in Hispania non semel fuisse factum scimus: quasi fera irritata, ominium telis peti debet, cum, humanitate abdicata, tyrannum induit. Sic Petro rege ob immanitatem dejecto publice, Henricus ejus frater, quamvis ex impari matre, regnum obtinuit. Sic Henrico hujus abnepote ob ignaviam pravosque mores abdicato procerum suffragiis, primum Alfonsus ejus frater, recte an secus non disputo, sed tamen in tenera actate rex est proclamatus: deinde defuncto Alfonso, Elisabetha ejas soror, Henrico invito, rerum summam ad se traxit, regio tantum nomine abstinens dum ille vixit. Mariana, de Rege et Regis Institut. Lib. 1. c. iii.

To this authority, furnished by Spain, join that of Scotland, proved by the letter of the barons to the pope, dated April 6, 1320, requesting him to prevail on the king of England to desist from his enterprises against Scotland. After having spoken of the evils they had suffered from him. they add — A quibus malis innumeris, ipso juvante qui post vulnera medetur et sanat, liberati sumus per serenissimum principem regem et dominum nostrum. dominum Robertum, qui pro populo et haereditate suis de manibus inimicorm liberandis, quasi alter Maccabaeus aut Josue, labores et taedia, inedias et pericula laeto sustinuit animo. Quem etiam divina dispositio, et (juxta leges et consuetudines nostras, quas usque ad mortem sustinere volumus) juris successio, et debitus nostrorum consensus et assensus nostrum fecerunt principem atque regem: cui, tanquam liii per quem salus in populo facta est, pro nostra libertate tuenda, tam jure quam meritis tenemur, et volumus in omnibus adhaerere. Quem, si ab inceptis desistet, regi Anglorum aut Anglis nos aut regnum nostrum volens subjicere, tanquam inimicum nostrum et sui nostrique juris subversorem, statim expellere nitemur, et alium regem nostrum, qui ad defensionem nostram sufficiet, faciemus: quia quamdiu centum viri remanserint, numquam Anglorum dominio aliquatenus volumus subjugari, Non enim propter gloriam, divitias, aut honores pugnamus, sed propter libertatem solummodo, quam remo, bonus nisi simul eum vita amittit.

“In the year 1581” (says Grotius, Ann. Book III.) “the confederated provinces of the Netherlands — after having for nine years continued to wage war against Philip the Second, without ceasing to acknowledge him as their sovereign — at length solemnly deprived him of the authority he had possessed over their country, because he had violated their laws and privileges,” The author afterwards observes, that “France, Spain herself, England, Sweden, Denmark, furnish instances of kings deposed by their people; so that there are at present few sovereigns in Europe whose right to the crown rests on any other foundation than the right which the people possess of divesting their sovereign of his power when he makes an ill use of it,” Pursuant to this idea, the United Provinces, in their justificatory letters on that subject, addressed to the princes of the empire and the king of Denmark — after having enumerated the oppressive acts of the king of Spain, added — “Then, by a mode which has been often enough adopted even by those nations that now live under kingly government, we wrested the sovereignty from him whose actions were all contrary to the duty of a prince.” Ibid. — Note, edit A.D. 1797.

6. Populi patroni non pauciora neque mis ora praesidia habent. Certe a republica, unde ortum habet regia potestas, rebus exigentibus, regens in jus vocari potest, et, si sanitatem respuat, principatu spoiliari; neque ita in principem jura potestatis transtuilit, ut non sibi majorem reservârit potestatem. Ibid. cap. vi.

Est tamen salutaris cogitatio, ut sit principibus persuasum, si rempublicam oppresserint, si vitiis et foeditate intolerandi erunt, ea se conditione vivere, ut non jure tantum, sed cum laude et gloria, perimi possint. Ibid. — Note. edit. A.D. 1797.

7. Mezeray’s History of France, vol. ii. p. 1107.

8. De Jure Belli & Pacis. lib. i. cap. lv. § 11, n. 2

Rights And Duties Of All Citizens Residing In Any Nation/State

May 9, 2017

§ 211. What is our country.

THE whole of the countries possessed by a nation and subject to its laws, forms, as we have already said, its territory, and is the common country of all the individuals of the nation. We have been obliged to anticipate the definition of the term, native country (§ 122), because our subject led us to treat of the love of our country — a virtue so excellent and so necessary in a state. Supposing, then, this definition already known, it remains that we should explain several things that have a relation to this subject, and answer the questions that naturally arise from it.
§ 212. Citizens and natives.

The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens. As the society cannot exist and perpetuate itself otherwise than by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights. The society is supposed to desire this, in consequence of what it owes to its own preservation; and it is presumed, as matter of course, that each citizen, on entering into society, reserves to his children the right of becoming members of it. The country of the fathers is therefore that of the children; and these become true citizens merely by their tacit consent. We shall soon see whether, on their coming to the years of discretion, they may renounce their right, and what they owe to the society in which they were born. I say, that, in order to be of the country, it is necessary that a person be born of a father who is a citizen; for, if he is born there of a foreigner, it will be only the place of his birth, and not his country.
§ 213. Inhabitants.

The inhabitants, as distinguished from citizens, are foreigners, who are permitted to settle and stay in the country. Bound to the society by their residence, they are subject to the laws of the state while they reside in it; and they are obliged to defend it, because it grants them protection, though they do not participate in all the rights of citizens. They enjoy only the advantages which the law or custom gives them. The perpetual inhabitants are those who have received the right of perpetual residence. These are a kind of citizens of an inferior order, and are united to the society without participating in all its advantages. Their children follow the condition of their fathers; and, as the state has given to these the right of perpetual residence, their right passes to their posterity.
§ 214. Naturalization.(58)

A nation, or the sovereign who represents it, may grant to a foreigner the quality of citizen, by admitting him into the body of the political society. This is called naturalization. There are some states in which the sovereign cannot grant to a foreigner all the rights of citizens, — for example, that of holding public offices — and where, consequently, he has the power of granting only an imperfect naturalization. It is here a regulation of the fundamental law, which limits the power of the prince. In other states, as in England and Poland, the prince cannot naturalize a single person, without the concurrence of the nation, represented by its deputies. Finally, there are states, as, for instance, England, where the single circumstance of being born in the country naturalizes the children of a foreigner.
§ 215. Children of citizens born in a foreign country.

It is asked whether the children born of citizens in a foreign country are citizens? The laws have decided this question in several countries, and their regulations must be followed.(59) By the law of nature alone, children follow the condition of their fathers, and enter into all their rights (§ 212); the place of birth produces no change in this particular, and cannot, of itself, furnish any reason for taking from a child what nature has given him; I say “of itself,” for, civil or political laws may, for particular reasons, ordain otherwise. But I suppose that the father has not entirely quitted his country in order to settle elsewhere. If he has fixed his abode in a foreign country, he is become a member of another society, at least as a perpetual inhabitant; and his children will be members of it also.
§ 216. Children born at sea.

As to children born at sea, if they are born in those parts of it that are possessed by their nation, they are born in the country: if it is on the open sea, there is no reason to make a distinction between them and those who are born in the country; for, naturally, it is our extraction, not the place of our birth, that gives us rights: and if the children are born in a vessel belonging to the nation, they may be reputed born in its territories; for, it is natural to consider the vessels of a nation as parts of its territory, especially when they sail upon a free sea, since the state retains its jurisdiction over those vessels. And as, according to the commonly received custom, this jurisdiction is preserved over the vessels, even in parts of the sea subject to a foreign dominion, all the children born in the vessels of a nation are considered as born in its territory. For the same reason, those born in a foreign vessel are reputed born in a foreign country, unless their birth took place in a port belonging to their own nation; for, the port is more particularly a part of the territory; and the mother, though at that moment on board a foreign vessel, is not on that account out of the country. I suppose that she and her husband have not quitted their native country to settle elsewhere.
§ 217. Children born in the armies of the state.

For the same reasons also, children born out of the country, in the armies of the state, or in the house of its minister at a foreign court, are reputed born in the country; for a citizen who is absent with his family, on the service of the state, but still dependent on it, and subject to its jurisdiction, cannot be considered as having quitted its territory.
§ 218. Settlement.

Settlement is a fixed residence in any place, with an intention of always staying there. A man does not, then, establish his settlement in any place, unless he makes sufficiently known his intention of fixing there, either tacitly or by an express declaration. However, this declaration is no reason why, if he afterwards changes his mind, he may not transfer his settlement elsewhere. In this sense, a person who stops at a place upon business, even though he stay a long time, has only a simple habitation there, but has no settlement. Thus, the envoy of a foreign prince has not his settlement at the court where he resides.

The natural, or original settlement, is that which we acquire by birth, in the place where our father has his; and we are considered as retaining it, till we have abandoned it, in order to choose another. The acquired settlement (adscititium) is that where we settle by our own choice.
§ 219. Vagrants.

Vagrants are people who have no settlement. Consequently, those born of vagrant parents have no country, since a man’s country is the place where, at the time of his birth, his parents had their settlement (§ 122), or it is the state of which his father was then a member, which comes to the same point; for, to settle for ever in a nation, is to become a member of it, at least as a perpetual inhabitant, if not with all the privileges of a citizen. We may, however, consider the country of a vagrant to be that of his child, while that vagrant is considered as not having absolutely renounced his natural or original settlement.
§ 220. Whether a person may quit his country.

Many distinctions will be necessary, in order to give a complete solution to the celebrated question, whether a man may quit his country or the society of which he is a member.(60) — 1. The children are bound by natural ties to the society in which they were born; they are under an obligation to show themselves grateful for the protection it has afforded to their fathers, and are in a great measure indebted to it for their birth and education. They ought, therefore, to love it, as we have already shown (§ 122), to express a just gratitude to it, and requite its services as far as possible, by serving it in turn. We have observed above (§ 212), that they have a right to enter into the society of which their fathers were members. But every man is born free; and the son of a citizen, when come to the years of discretion, may examine whether it be convenient for him to join the society for which he was destined by his birth. If he does not find it advantageous to remain in it, he is at liberty to quit it, on making it a compensation for what it has done in his favour,1 and preserving, as far as his new engagements will allow him, the sentiments of love and gratitude he owes it. A man’s obligations to his natural country may, however, change, lessen, or entirely vanish, according as he shall have quitted it lawfully, and with good reason, in order to choose another, or has been banished from it deservedly or unjustly, in due form of law or by violence.

2. As soon as the son of a citizen attains the age of manhood, and acts as a citizen, he tacitly assumes that character; his obligations, like those of others who expressly and formally enter into engagements with society, become stronger and more extensive: but the case is very different with respect to him of whom we have been speaking. When a society has not been formed for a determinate time, it is allowable to quit it, when that separation can take place without detriment to the society. A citizen may therefore quit the state of which he is a member, provided it be not in such a conjuncture when he cannot abandon it without doing it a visible injury. But we must here draw a distinction between what may in strict justice be done, and what is honourable and conformable to every duty — in a word, between the internal, and the external obligation. Every man has a right to quit his country, in order to settle in any other, when by that step he does not endanger the welfare of his country. But a good citizen will never determine on such a step without necessity, or without very strong reasons. It is taking a dishonourable advantage of our liberty, to quit our associates upon slight pretences, after having derived considerable advantages from them; and this is the case of every citizen, with respect to his country.

3. As to those who have the cowardice to abandon their country in a time of danger, and seek to secure themselves, instead of defending it, they manifestly violate the social compact, by which all the contracting parties engaged to defend themselves in a united body, and in concert; they are infamous deserters, whom the state has a right to punish severely.2
§ 221. How a person may absent himself for a time.

In a time of peace and tranquillity, when the country has no actual need of all her children, the very welfare of the state, and that of the citizens, requires that every individual be at liberty to travel on business, provided that he be always ready to return, whenever the public interest recalls him. It is not presumed that any man has bound himself to the society of which he is a member, by an engagement never to leave the country when the interest of his affairs requires it, and when he can absent himself without injury to his country.
§ 222. Variation of the political laws in this respect, (61) These must be obeyed.

The political laws of nations vary greatly in this respect. In some nations, it is at all times, except in case of actual war, allowed to every citizen to absent himself, and even to quit the country altogether, whenever he thinks proper without alleging any reason for it. This liberty, contrary in its own nature to the welfare and safety of society, can nowhere be tolerated but in a country destitute of resources and incapable of supplying the wants of its inhabitants. In such a country there can only be an imperfect society; for civil society ought to be capable of enabling all its members to procure, by their own labour and industry, all the necessaries of life: unless it effects this, it has no right to require them to devote themselves entirely to it. In some other states, every citizen is left at liberty to travel abroad on business, but not to quit his country altogether, without the express permission of the sovereign. Finally, there are states where the rigour of the government will not permit any one whatsoever to go out of the country without passports in form, which are even not granted without great difficulty. In all these cases, it is necessary to conform to the laws, when they are made by a lawful authority. But, in the last-mentioned case, the sovereign abuses his power, and reduces his subjects to an insupportable slavery, if he refuses them permission to travel for their own advantage, when he might grant it to them without inconvenience, and without danger to the state. Nay, it will presently appear, that, on certain occasions, he cannot, under any pretext, detain persons who wish to quit the country, with the intention of abandoning it for ever.
§ 223. Cases in which a citizen has a right to quit his country.

There are cases in which a citizen has an absolute right to renounce his country, and abandon it entirely — a right founded on reasons derived from the very nature of the social compact. 1. If the citizen cannot procure subsistence in his own country, it is undoubtedly lawful for him to seek it elsewhere. For, political or civil society being entered into only with a view of facilitating to each of its members the means of supporting himself, and of living in happiness and safety, it would be absurd to pretend that a member, whom it cannot furnish with such things as are most necessary, has not a right to leave it.

2. If the body of the society, or he who represents it, absolutely fail to discharge their obligations towards a citizen, the latter may withdraw himself. For, if one of the contracting parties does not observe his engagements, the other is no longer bound to fulfil his; as the contract is reciprocal between the society and its members. It is on the same principle, also, that me society may expel a member who violates its laws.

3. If the major part of the nation, or the sovereign who represents it, attempt to enact laws relative to matters in which the social compact cannot oblige every citizen to submission, those who are averse to these laws have a right to quit the society, and go settle elsewhere. For instance, if the sovereign, or the greater part of the nation, will allow but one religion in the state, those who believe and profess another religion have a right to withdraw, and take with mem their families and effects. For, they cannot be supposed to have subjected themselves to the authority of men, in affairs of conscience;3 and if the society suffers and is weakened by their departure, the blame must be imputed to the intolerant party; for it is they who fail in their observance of the social compact — it is they who violate it, and force the others to a separation. We have elsewhere touched upon some other instances of this third case, — that of a popular state wishing to have a sovereign (§ 33), and that of an independent nation taking the resolution to submit to a foreign power (§ 195).
§ 224. Emigrants.

Those who quit their country for any lawful reason, with a design to settle elsewhere, and take their families and property with them, are called emigrants.
§ 225. Sources of their right

Their right to emigrate may arise from several sources. 1. In the cases we have just mentioned (§ 223), it is a natural right, which is certainly reserved to each individual in the very compact itself by which civil society was formed.

2. The liberty of emigration may, in certain cases, be secured to the citizens by a fundamental law of the state. The citizens of Neufchatel and Valangin in Switzerland may quit the country and carry off their effects at their own pleasure, without even paying any duties.

3. It may be voluntarily granted them by the sovereign.

4. This right may be derived from some treaty made with a foreign power, by which a sovereign has promised to leave full liberty to those of his subjects, who, for a certain reason — on account of religion, for instance — desire to transplant themselves into me territories of that power. There are such treaties between the German princes, particularly for cases in which religion is concerned. In Switzerland likewise, a citizen of Bern who wishes to emigrate to Fribourg, and there profess the religion of the place, and, reciprocally, a citizen of Fribourg who, for a similar reason, is desirous of removing to Bern, has a right to quit his native country, and carry off with him all his property.

It appears from several passages in history, particularly the history of Switzerland and the neighbouring countries, that the law of nations, established there by custom some ages back, did not permit a state to receive the subjects of another state into the number of its citizens. This vicious custom had no other foundation than the slavery to which the people were then reduced. A prince, a lord, ranked his subjects under the head of his private property; he calculated their number as he did that of his flocks; and, to the disgrace of human nature, this strange abuse is not yet everywhere eradicated.
§226. If the sovereign infringes their right, he injures them.

If the sovereign attempts to molest those who have a right to emigrate, he does them an injury; and the injured individuals may lawfully implore the protection of the power who is willing to receive them. Thus we have seen Frederic William, king of Prussia, grant his protection to the emigrant Protestants of Saltzburgh.
§227. Supplicants.

The name of supplicants is given to all fugitives who implore the protection of a sovereign against the nation or prince they have quitted. We cannot solidly establish what the law of nations determines with respect to them, until we have treated of the duties of one nation towards others.
§ 228. Exile and banishment.

Finally, exile is another manner of leaving our country. An exile is a man driven from the place of his settlement, or constrained to quit it, but without a mark of infamy. Banishment is a similar expulsion, with a mark of infamy annexed.4 Both may be for a limited time, or for ever. If an exile, or banished man, had his settlement in his own country, he is exiled or banished from his country. It is, however, proper to observe that common usage applies also the terms exile and banishment to the expulsion of a foreigner who is driven from a country where he had no settlement, and to which he is, either for a limited time, or for ever, prohibited to return.

As a man may be deprived of any right whatsoever by way of punishment — exile, which deprives him of the right of dwelling in a certain place, may be inflicted as a punishment: banishment is always one; for, a mark of infamy cannot be set on any one, but with a view of punishing him for a fault, either real or pretended.

When the society has excluded one of its members by a perpetual banishment, he is only banished from the lands of that society, and it cannot hinder him from living wherever else he pleases; for, after having driven him out, it can no longer claim any authority over him. The contrary, however, may take place by particular conventions between two or more states. Thus, every member of the Helvetic confederacy may banish its own subject out of the territories of Switzerland in general; and in this case the banished person will not be allowed to live in any of the cantons, or in the territories of their allies.

Exile is divided into voluntary and involuntary. It is voluntary, when a man quits his settlement to escape some punishment, or to avoid some calamity — and involuntary, when it is the effect of a superior order.

Sometimes a particular place is appointed, where the exiled person is to remain during his exile; or a certain space is particularized, which he is forbid to enter. These various circumstances and modifications depend on him who has the power of sending into exile.
§ 229. The exile and banished man have a right to live somewhere.

A man, by being exiled or banished, does not forfeit the human character, nor consequently his right to dwell somewhere on earth. He derives this right from nature, or rather from its Author, who has destined the earth for the habitation of mankind; and the introduction of property cannot have impaired the right which every man has to the use of such things as are absolutely necessary — a right which he brings with him into the world at the moment of his birth.
§ 230. Nature of this right.

But though this right is necessary and perfect in the general view of it, we must not forget that it is but imperfect with respect to each particular country. For, on the other hand, every nation has a right to refuse admitting a foreigner into her territory, when he cannot enter it without exposing the nation to evident danger, or doing her a manifest injury, what she owes to herself, the care of her own safety, gives her this right; and, in virtue of her natural liberty, it belongs to the nation to judge, whether her circumstances will or will not justify the admission of that foreigner (Prelim. § 16). He cannot, then, settle by a full right, and as he pleases, in the place he has chosen, but must ask permission of the chief of the place; and, if it is refused, it is his duty to submit.
§ 231. Duty of nations towards them.

However, as property could not be introduced to the prejudice of the right acquired by every human creature, of not being absolutely deprived of such things as are necessary — no nation can, without good reasons, refuse even a perpetual residence to a man driven from his country. But, if particular and substantial reasons prevent her from affording him an asylum, this man has no longer any right to demand it — because, in such a case, the country inhabited by the nation cannot, at the same time, serve for her own use, and that of this foreigner. Now, supposing even that things are still in common, nobody can arrogate to himself the use of a thing which actually serves to supply the wants of another. Thus, a nation, whose lands are scarcely sufficient to supply the wants of the citizens, is not obliged to receive into its territories a company of fugitives or exiles. Thus, it ought even absolutely to reject them, if they are infected with a contagious disease. Thus, also, it has a right to send them elsewhere, if it has just cause to fear that they will corrupt the manners of the citizens, that they will create religious disturbances, or occasion any other disorder, contrary to the public safety. In a word, it has a right, and is even obliged to follow, in this respect, the suggestions of prudence. But this prudence should be free from unnecessary suspicion and jealousy; it should not be carried so far as to refuse a retreat to the unfortunate, for slight reasons, and on groundless and frivolous fears. The means of tempering it will be, never to lose sight of that charity and commiseration which are due to the unhappy. We must not suppress these feelings even for those who have fallen into misfortune through their own fault. For, we ought to hate the crime, but love the man, since all mankind ought to love each other.
§ 232. A nation cannot punish them for faults committed out of its territories.

If an exiled or banished man has been driven from his country for any crime, it does not belong to the nation in which he has taken refuge to punish him for that fault committed in a foreign country. For, nature does not give to men or to nations any right to inflict punishment, except for their own defence and safety (§ 169); whence it follows that we cannot punish any but those by whom we have been injured.
§ 233. Except such as affect the common safety of mankind.

But this very reason shows, that, although the justice of each nation ought in general to be confined to the punishment of crimes committed in its own territories, we ought to except from this rule those villains, who, by the nature and habitual frequency of their crimes, violate all public security, and declare themselves the enemies of the human race. Poisoners, assassins, and incendiaries by profession, may be exterminated wherever they are seized; for they attack and injure all nations by trampling under foot the foundations of their common safety. Thus, pirates are sent to the gibbet by the first into whose hands they fall. If the sovereign of the country where crimes of that nature have been committed, reclaims the perpetrators of them, in order to bring them to punishment, they ought to be surrendered to him, as being the person who is principally interested in punishing them in an exemplary manner. And as it is proper to have criminals regularly convicted by a trial in due form of law, this is a second reason for delivering up malefactors of that class to the states where their crimes have been committed. (62)

(58) See fully in general, and of naturalization in Great Britain in particular, 1 Chitty’s Commercial Law, 123 to 131; 1 Bla. Com. 369; Bac. Ab. Aliens. A naturalization in a foreign country, without license, wilt not discharge a natural-born subject from his allegiance, 2 Chalmer’s Col. Opin. 363. But a natural-born subject of England, naturalized in America, was holden to be entitled to trade as an American subject to the East Indies, 8 Term Rep. 39, 43, 45; and see Reeves, 2d ed. 328, 330, and 37 Geo. 3, c. 97. — C.

{A native citizen of the United States cannot throw off his allegiance to the government, without an Act of Congress authorizing him to do so. Miller v. The Resolution, 1 Dall. 10; Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. S.C. Rep. 246; Coxe v. McIlvaine, 4 Cranch, 209; The Santissinta Trinidada, 7 Wheat. Rep. 763. The United states v. Gillies, Peter’s C.C. Rep. 159.)

(59) See 1 Chitty’s Commercial Law, 114, n. 1.; 115, n. 1.

(60) In Great Britain, the established maxim is nemo potest exuere patriam, 1 Bla. C. 369, 3 Chit. Com. Law, 129 to 132.

1. This is the foundation of the tax paid on quitting a country, called, in Latin, census emigrationis.

2. Charles XII. condemned to death and executed General Patkul, a native of Livonia, whom he had made prisoner in an engagement with the Saxons. But the sentence and execution were a violation of the laws of justice. Patkul, it is true, had been born a subject of the king of Sweden; but he had quitted his native country at the age of twelve years, and having been promoted in the army of Saxony, had, with the permission of his former sovereign sold the property he possessed in Livonia. he had therefore quitted his own country, to choose another (as every free citizen is at liberty to do, except, as we have observed above, at a critical moment, when the circumstances of his country require the aid of all her sons), and the king of Sweden, by permitting him to sell his property, had consented to his emigration.

(61) See post. Book II. ch. viii. § 108, p. 174. and Chitty’s General Practice, p. 731 to 736, as to writs of ne exeat regno.

(62) A distinction has usually been taken between capital offences and mere misdemeanors, and for one state to allow the taking and removing an offender of the former class back into the country where the offence was committed, in order to take his trial in the latter, but not so in case of misdemeanors. But sometimes, as upon a charge of perjury, a foreign country will allow the removal of an offender even in case of a misdemeanor. See Ex parte Scott, 9 Barn. & Cress. 446. (A foreign government has no right, by the Law of Nations, to demand of the government of the United States a surrender of a citizen or subject of such foreign government, who has committed a crime in his own country. Such a right can only exist by treaty. Comm. v. Deacon, 10 Serg. &c Raw. 125; Case of Dos Santos, 2 Brocken. Rep. 493. The Case of Robins, Bee’s Rep. 266; was under the treaty with Great Britain.)

3. See above, the chapter on Religion.

4. The common acceptation of these two terms is not repugnant to our application of them. The French academy says, “Banishment is only applied to condemnations indue course of law. Exile is only an absence caused by some disgrace at court.” The reason is plain: such a condemnation from the tribunal of justice entails infamy on the emigrant; whereas a disgrace at court does not usually involve the same consequence.

The Status of the Law of Nations In Early American Law

May 9, 2017

The Status of the Law of Nations In Early American Law

It should be clear who a Nation/State belongs to and who it does not belong to…
[Sylvester, supra note 55, at 67; see also Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 823 (1989) (“In ascertaining principles of the law of nations, lawyers and judges of that era relied heavily on continental treatise writers, Vattel being the most often consulted by Americans. An essential part of a sound legal education consisted of reading Vattel, Grotius, Pufendorf, and Burlamaqui, among others.”).]

Below is what Vattel and the Law of Nations has to say…
“The law of nations is the law of sovereigns. It is principally for them, and for their ministers, that it ought to be written. All mankind are indeed interested in it; and, in a free country, the study of its maxims is a proper employment for every citizen; but it would be of little consequence to impart the knowledge of it only to private individuals, who are not called to the councils of nations, and who have no influence in directing the public measures. If the conductors of slates, if all those who are employed in public affairs, condescended to apply seriously to the study of a science which ought to be their law, and, as it were, the compass by which to steer their course, what happy effects might we not expect from a good treatise on the law of nations! We every day feel the advantages of a good body of laws in civil society: — the law of nations is, in point of importance, as much superior to the civil law, as the proceedings of nations and sovereigns are more momentous in their consequences than those of private persons….”

“…But fatal experience too plainly proves how little regard those who are at the head of affairs pay to the dictates of justice, in conjunctures where they hope to find their advantage. Satisfied with bestowing their attention on a system of politics which is often false, since often unjust, the generality of them think they have done enough when they have thoroughly studied that. Nevertheless, we may truly apply to states a maxim which has long been acknowledged as true with respect to individuals, — that the best and safest policy is that which is founded on virtue. Cicero, as a great master in the art of government as in eloquence and philosophy, does not content himself with rejecting the vulgar maxim, that “a state cannot be happily governed without committing injustice;” he even proceeds so far as to lay down the very reverse of the proposition as an invariable truth, and maintains, that “without a strict attention to the most rigid justice, public affairs cannot be advantageously administered.”

Providence occasionally bestows on the world kings and ministers whose minds are impressed with this great truth. Let us not renounce the pleasing hope that the number of those wise conductors of nations will one day be multiplied; and in the interim let us, each in his own sphere, exert our best efforts to accelerate the happy period.”~[Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations]

From: The Law of Nations; Preliminaries: (This is what “States should be attain­ing” and this will give you a clue about what “all indi­vid­uals in a State” should be striv­ing for.)

§ 4. In what light nations or states are to be considered.
Nations being composed of men naturally free and independent, and who, before the establishment of civil societies, lived together in the state of nature, — Nations, or sovereign states, are to be considered as so many free persons living together in the state of nature.

It is a settled point with writers on the natural law, that all men inherit from nature a perfect liberty and independence, of which they cannot be deprived without their own consent. In a State, the individual citizens do not enjoy them fully and absolutely, because they have made a partial surrender of them to the sovereign. But the body of the nation, the State, remains absolutely free and independent with respect to all other men, and all other Nations, as long as it has not voluntarily submitted to them.

§ 10. Society established by nature between all mankind
Man is so formed by nature, that he cannot supply all his own wants, but necessarily stands in need of the intercourse and assistance of his fellow-creatures, whether for his immediate preservation, or for the sake of perfecting his nature, and enjoying such a life as is suitable to a rational being. This is sufficiently proved by experience. We have instances of persons, who, having grown up to manhood among the bears of the forest, enjoyed not the use of speech or of reason, but were, like the brute beasts, possessed only of sensitive faculties. We see moreover that nature has refused to bestow on men the same strength and natural weapons of defence with which she has furnished other animals — having, in lieu of those advantages, endowed mankind with the faculties of speech and reason, or at least a capability of acquiring them by an intercourse with their fellow-creatures. Speech enables them to communicate with each other, to give each other mutual assistance, to perfect their reason and knowledge; and having thus become intelligent, they find a thousand methods of preserving themselves, and supplying their wants. Each individual, moreover, is intimately conscious that he can neither live happily nor improve his nature without the intercourse and assistance of others. Since, therefore, nature has thus formed mankind, it is a convincing proof of her intention that they should communicate with, and mutually aid and assist each other.

Hence is deduced the establishment of natural society among men. The general law of that society is, that each individual should do for the others every thing which their necessities require, and which he can perform without neglecting the duty that he owes to himself: (4) a law which all men must observe in order to live in a manner consonant to their nature, and conformable to the views of their common Creator — a law which our own safety, our happiness, our dearest interests, ought to render sacred to every one of us. Such is the general obligation that binds us to the observance of our duties: let us fulfil them with care, if we would wisely endeavour to promote our own advantage. (5)

From: The Law of Nations; Book 1:
§ 14. Of the preservation and perfection of a nation.
He who no longer exists can have no duties to perform: and a moral being is charged with obligations to himself, only with a view to his perfection and happiness: for to preserve and to perfect his own nature, is the sum of all his duties to himself.
The preservation of a nation is found in what renders it capable of obtaining the end of civil society; and a nation is in a perfect state, when nothing necessary is wanting to arrive at that end. We know that the perfection of a thing consists, generally, in the perfect agreement of all its constituent parts to tend to the same end. A nation being a multitude of men united together in civil society — if in that multitude all conspire to attain the end proposed in forming a civil society, the nation is perfect; and it is more or less so, according as it approaches more or less to that perfect agreement. In the same manner its external state will be more or less perfect, according as it concurs with the interior perfection of the nation,

§ 21. A nation ought to perfect itself and the state.
The second general duty of a nation towards itself is to labour at its own perfection and that of its state. It is this double perfection that renders a nation capable of attaining the end of civil society: it would be absurd to unite in society, and yet not endeavour to promote the end of that union.
Here the entire body of a nation, and each individual citizen, are bound by a double obligation, the one immediately proceeding from nature, and the other resulting from their reciprocal engagements. Nature lays an obligation upon each man to labour after his own perfection; and in so doing, he labours after that of civil society, which could not fail to be very flourishing, were it composed of none but good citizens. But the individual finding in a well-regulated society the most powerful succours to enable him to fulfil the task which Nature imposes upon him in relation to himself, for becoming better, and consequently more happy — he is doubtless obliged to contribute all in his power to render that society more perfect.
All the citizens who form a political society reciprocally engage to advance the common welfare, and as far as possible to promote the advantage of each member. Since then the perfection of the society is what enables it to secure equally the happiness of the body and that of the members, the grand object of the engagements and duties of a citizen is to aim at this perfection, This is more particularly the duty of the body collective in all their common deliberations, and in everything they do as a body. (18)

End Law of Nations; Below Citizen defined..

Section 1; 14th Amendement;
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, AND SUBJECT to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”Definition of subject
1 : one that is placed under authority or control: such asa : vassalb (1) : one subject to a monarch and governed by the monarch’s law (2) : one who lives in the territory of, enjoys the protection of, and owes allegiance to a sovereign power or state

subject (v.)
late 14c., “to make (a person or nation) subject to another by force,” also “to render submissive or dependent,” from Medieval Latin subiectare “place beneath,” frequentative of Latin subicere “to make subject, subordinate” (see subject (n.)). Meaning “to lay open or expose to (some force or occurrence)” is recorded from early 15c. (implied in subjected). Related: Subjecting.
subject (n.)
early 14c., “person under control or dominion of another,” specifically a government or ruler, from Old French sogit, suget, subget “a subject person or thing” (12c., Modern French sujet), from noun use of Latin subiectus “lying under, below, near bordering on,” figuratively “subjected, subdued,” past participle of subicere, subiicere “to place under, throw under, bind under; to make subject, subordinate,” from sub “under” (see sub-) + combining form of iacere “to throw” (see jet (v.)). In 14c., sugges, sogetis, subgit, sugette; form re-Latinized in English 16c.

Meaning “person or thing regarded as recipient of action, one that may be acted upon” is recorded from 1590s. Grammatical sense is recorded from 1630s, from Latin subjectum “grammatical subject,” noun use of the neuter of the Latin past participle. Likewise some restricted uses in logic and philosophy are borrowed directly from Latin subjectum as “foundation or subject of a proposition,” a loan-translation of Aristotle’s to hypokeimenon. Meaning “subject matter of an art or science” is attested from 1540s, probably short for subject matter (late 14c.), which is from Medieval Latin subjecta materia, a loan translation of Greek hypokeimene hyle (Aristotle), literally “that which lies beneath.”

allegiance (n.)
“ties or obligations of a citizen or subject to a government or sovereign,” late 14c., formed in English from Anglo-French legaunce “loyalty of a liege-man to his lord,” from Old French legeance, from liege (see liege (adj.)). Corrupted in spelling by confusion with the now-obsolete legal term allegeance “alleviation, mitigation” (for which see allay (v.)). General figurative sense of “recognition of claims to respect or duty, observance of obligation” is attested from 1732. French allégeance in this sense is said to be from English.

liege (adj.)
c. 1300, of lords, “entitled to feudal allegiance and service,” from Anglo-French lige (late 13c.), Old French lige “liege-lord,” noun use of an adjective meaning “free, giving or receiving fidelity” (corresponding to Medieval Latin ligius, legius), a word of uncertain origin. Perhaps from Late Latin laeticus “cultivated by serfs,” from laetus “serf,” which probably is from Proto-Germanic *lethiga- “freed” (source also of Old English læt “half-freedman, serf;” Old High German laz, Old Frisian lethar “freedman;” Middle Dutch ledich “idle, unemployed”), from PIE root *le- (2) “let go, slacken” (see let (v.)). Or the Middle English word might be directly from Old High German leidig “free,” on the notion of “free from obligation to service except as vassal to one lord,” but this reverses the notion contained in the word.

From late 14c. of vassals, “bound to render feudal allegiance and service.” The dual sense of the adjective reflects the reciprocal relationship it describes: protection in exchange for service. Hence, liege-man “a vassal sworn to the service and support of a lord, who in turn is obliged to protect him” (mid-14c.).

word-forming element attached to verbs to form abstract nouns of process or fact (convergence from converge), or of state or quality (absence from absent); ultimately from Latin -antia and -entia, which depended on the vowel in the stem word, from PIE *-nt-, adjectival suffix.
Definition of -ance
1 : action or process furtherance : instance of an action or process performance
2 : quality or state : instance of a quality or state protuberance
3 : amount or degree conductance

I can keep going with this.. Corpus Juris Secundem Citizen defined backs this up also..

Interesting how they established freedom by enslaving everyone else…

Law of Nations Book IV Chap. 1

May 9, 2017

Law of Nations Book Four Chap. 1

The point here is who are the disturbers of the public peace.. Anyone complaining about how these Nation/States manage their business.. From the lies to the environment to the privileges issues of their subjects.. Obviously we’re observing disturbers of the public peace categorization and management.. Even to the point of setting up sting operations.. Using actors to draw disturbers of the public peace, belligerents to the bait.. For arrests and trials.. These operations will have front people, who say all of the right things, smile, are kind leading the various groups of patriotic disturbers of the public peace, environmentalist disturbers of the public peace, political disturbers of the public peace, animal rights activist disturbers of the public peace…And so on..They are never going to let the subjects tell them how to manage their business.. Oh and, another way they manage the disturbers of the public peace is by allowing them to participate in staged elections by voting.. Nothing but frustration relief valves for disturbers of the public peace.. Ignorance of their right to conduct their business how they deem it necessary and proper as so stated in their own political charter is no excuse.. Misinterpretation of their political charters, the basis of their political charters, the statutes and codes deemed proper by their corporate boardrooms for management of all of their resources properties, in the case of this nation/State the U.S. Congress Assembled is the United States.. Is No Excuse.. Being unread and ignorant of the facts is no excuse.. Now, even if there were a large enough rebellion here to over throw the U.S. Congress Assembled United States, the United Nations as a whole would not tolerate it.. The rebels would have to whip the world.. It should be noted that the intelligence agencies operating the National Security apparatus have been forming these various disturbers of the public peace groups for decades.. One being the John Birch Society.. All patriot organizations.. All Environmental psyops.. All of it.. The NRA.. you name it.. There are to many group psyops to list here.. World wide controlled opposition.. This priceless evidence in book form is only $25.00.. So the citizen subjugated by the sovereign has a choice, keep being a disturber of the public peace…Zombie…Or learn how to go to peace with the adversary, such as walk away from them and their private business.. They do tell you that.. Walk away.. Another great voice once said, “Get out of her my people”.. “That you not suffer her plagues”..

The citizen wallows in the muck of slavery and knows not why…



§ l. What peace is.
PEACE is the reverse of war: it is that desirable state in which every one quietly enjoys his rights, or, if controverted, amicably discusses them by force of argument. Hobbes has had the boldness to assert, that war is the natural state of man. But if, by “the natural state of man,” we understand (as reason requires that we should) that state to which he is destined and called by his nature, peace should rather be termed his natural state. For, it is the part of a rational being to terminate his differences by rational methods; whereas, it is the characteristic of the brute creation to decide theirs by force.1 Man, as we have already observed (Prelim. § 10), alone and destitute of succours, would necessarily be a very wretched creature. He stands in need of the intercourse and assistance of his species, in order to enjoy the sweets of life, to develop his faculties, and live in a manner suitable to his nature. Now, it is in peace alone that all these advantages are to be found: it is in peace that men respect, assist, and love each other: nor would they ever depart from that happy state, if they were not hurried on by the impetuosity of their passions, and blinded by the gross deceptions of self-love. What little we have said of the effects will be sufficient to give some idea of its various calamities; and it is an unfortunate circumstance for the human race, that the injustice of unprincipled men should so often render it inevitable.

§ 2. Obligation of cultivating it
Nations who are really impressed with sentiments of humanity, — who seriously attend to their duty, and are acquainted with their true and substantial interests, — will never seek to promote their own advantage at the expense and detriment of other nations: however intent they may be on their own happiness, they will ever be careful to combine it with that of others, and with justice and equity. Thus disposed, they will necessarily cultivate peace. If they do not live together in peace, how can they perform those mutual and sacred duties which nature enjoins them? And this state is found to be no less necessary to their happiness than to the discharge of their duties. Thus, the law of nature every way obliges them to seek and cultivate peace. That divine law has no other end in view than the welfare of mankind: to that object all its rules and all its precepts lend: they are alt deducible from this principle, that men should seek their own felicity; and morality is no more than the art of acquiring happiness. As this is true of individuals, it is equally so of nations, as must appear evident to any one who will but take the trouble of reflecting on what we have said of their common and reciprocal duties, in the first chapter of the second book.

3. The sovereign’s obligation to it.
This obligation of cultivating peace binds the sovereign by a double tie. He owes this attention to his people, on whom war would pour a torrent of evils; and he owes it in the most strict and indispensable manner, since it is solely for the advantage and welfare of the nation that he is intrusted with the government. (Book I. § 39.) He owes the same attention to foreign nations, whose happiness likewise is disturbed by war. The nation’s duty in this respect has been shown in the preceding chapter; and the sovereign, being invested with the public authority, is at the same time charged with all the duties of the society, or body of the nation. (Book I. § 41.)

§ 4. Extent of this duty
The nation or the sovereign ought not only to refrain, on their own part, from disturbing that peace which is so salutary to mankind: they are, moreover, bound to promote it as far as lies in their power, — to prevent others from breaking it without necessity, and to inspire them with the love of justice, equity, and public tranquillity, — in a word, with the love of peace. It is one of the best offices a sovereign can render to nations, and to the whole universe. What a glorious and amiable character is that of peace-maker! Were a powerful prince thoroughly acquainted with the advantages attending it, — were he to conceive what pure and effulgent glory he may derive from that endearing character, together with the gratitude, the love, the veneration, and the confidence of nations, — did he know what it is to reign over the hearts of men, — he would wish thus to become the benefactor, the friend, the father of mankind; and in being so, he would find infinitely more delight than in the most splendid conquests. Augustus, shutting the temple of Janus, giving peace to the universe, and adjusting the disputes of kings and nations, — Augustus, at that moment, appears the greatest of mortals, and, as it were, a god upon earth.
§ 5. Of the disturbers of the public peace.

But those disturbers of the public peace, — those scourges of the earth, who, fired by a lawless thirst of power, or impelled by the pride and ferocity of their disposition, snatch up arms without justice or reason, and sport with the quiet of mankind and the blood of their subjects, — those monstrous heroes, though almost deified by the foolish admiration of the vulgar, are in effect the most cruel enemies of the human race, and ought to be treated as such. Experience shows what a train of calamities war entails even upon nations that are not immediately engaged in it. War disturbs commerce, destroys the subsistence of mankind, raises the price of all the most necessary articles, spreads just alarms, and obliges all nations to be upon their guard, and to keep up an armed force. He, therefore, who without just cause breaks the general peace, unavoidably does an injury even to those nations which are not the objects of his arms; and by his pernicious example he essentially attacks the happiness and safety of every nation upon earth. He gives them a right to join in a general confederacy for the purpose of repressing and chastising him, and depriving him of a power which he so enormously abuses. What evils does he not bring on his own nation, lavishing her blood to gratify his inordinate passions, and exposing her to the resentment of a host of enemies! A famous minister of the last century has justly merited the indignation of his country, by involving her in unjust or unnecessary wars. If by his abilities and indefatigable application, he procured her distinguished successes in the field of battle, he drew on her, at least for a time, the execration of all Europe.

§ 6. How far war may be continued.
The love of peace should equally prevent us from embarking in a war without necessity, and from persevering in it after the necessity has ceased to exist. When a sovereign has been compelled to take up arms for just and important reasons, he may carry on the operations of war till he has attained its lawful end, which is, to procure justice and safety. (Book III § 28.)
If the cause be dubious, the just end of war can only be to bring the enemy to an equitable compromise (Book III. § 38); and consequently the war must not be continued beyond that point. The moment our enemy proposes or consents to such compromise, it is our duty to desist from hostilities.
But if we have to do with a perfidious enemy, it would be imprudent to trust either his words or his oaths. In sucli case, justice allows and prudence requires that we should avail ourselves of a successful war, and follow up our advantages, till we have humbled a dangerous and excessive power, or compelled the enemy to give us sufficient security for the time to come.
Finally, if the enemy obstinately rejects equitable conditions, he himself forces us to continue our progress till we have obtained a complete and decisive victory, by which he is absolutely reduced and subjected. The use to be made of victory has been shown above. (Book III. Chap. VIII., IX., XIII.)
§ 7. Peace the end of war.
When one of the parties is reduced to sue for peace, or both are weary of the war, then thoughts of an accommodation are entertained, and the conditions are agreed on. Thus peace steps in and puts a period to the war.
§ 8. General effects of peace.
The general and necessary effects of peace are the reconciliation of enemies and the cessation of hostilities on both sides. It restores the two nations to their natural state.

1. Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alterum per vim, — cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc belluarum, — confuglendum est ad posterius, si ut non licet superiore. Cicero, de Offic. lib. i. cap. 11.

Law of Nations Book IV

Supreme Court Rulings Of The Past

May 6, 2017


They told us who we are.. And who they are.. And they’ve been telling us all along.

Case No. 3,776, 2 Gall. 398

Padelford, Fay & Co vs. The Mayor and Alderman of the City of Savannah

The courts decided in a little talked about case that the constitution is private compact and individual citizens had no rights to it. That comment is found on page 6 and 45.

Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore
32 U.S. 243 (1833)

Primary Holding
The Bill of Rights applies only to the federal government rather than state or local governments, since there is no textual evidence to support a different view.

Penhallow v. Doane’s Administrators
3 U.S. 54 (1795)

1 U.S. 41 (1779)

Resources List Part Two

May 5, 2017

I should thank Rockholm for pissing me off…

More Credible or A Deeper Analysis Of The Rewilding Agenda

“The Royal Society of Wildlife Trusts or RSWT…was previously known by the names Society for the Promotion of Nature Reserves and Royal Society for Nature Conservation.”

History –
“The forerunner of the RSWT, the Society for the Promotion of Nature Reserves, was established by Charles Rothschild in 1912. It aimed initially to draw up a list of the country’s best wildlife sites with a view to purchase for protection as nature reserves, and by 1915 it had drawn up a list of 284, known as Rothschild Reserves.”
Royal Society of Wildlife Trusts

Nathaniel Charles Rothschild (9 May 1877 – 12 October 1923), known as “Charles”, was an English banker and entomologist and a member of the Rothschild family.
Family –
Charles Rothschild worked as a partner in the family bank NM Rothschild and Sons in London.
Nature conservation –
He was concerned about the loss of wildlife habitats, and in 1912 set up the Society for the Promotion of Nature Reserves, the forerunner of The Wildlife Trusts partnership. In 1915 the Society produced a schedule of the best wildlife sites in the country, some of which were purchased as nature reserves.
Marriage –
In 1907 Charles Rothschild married Rozsika Edle von Wertheimstein (1870 – 30 June 1940), a Hungarian baroness and descendent of…one of the wealthiest families in Europe and had made their fortune over a century before the Rothschilds.
Charles Rothschild

The Rothschild Reserves –
In 1912 Charles Rothschild founded the ‘Society for the Promotion of Nature Reserves’ (SPNR).
More on the Rothschild Reserves –
“What was new about this approach to preserving ‘wild life’ was that it focussed on the habitat rather than just the individual species within it. It highlighted a growing belief that places needed protection from development and other damage. It showed a desire for an ordered and reasoned approach to acquiring nature reserves, in the face of increasign pressure on the natural world and culminated in a ‘shopping list’ of ideal sites – the Rothschild Reserves.”
“…the SPNR always established who the landowner was. The intention at this time was to purchase the land, turn it into a nature reserve and then hand it over to the National Trust to manage under special conditions.”
“It was believed that it was better to fence off nature and leave it to its own devices, rather than practically manage it…”
“The elite conservation crusaders could be seen to have inhabited a moral high ground where, from a lofty height, they shook their fists at progress in their quest for ‘primeval country’ and their desire to shut it off.”
The Wildlife Trusts, The Rothschild Reserves

Climate Change & Wildlife –
“Climate change is a significant threat to the UK’s wildlife. The Wildlife Trusts believe that nature should be central to both climate change adaptation (e.g. through the use of natural processes to reduce flood risk) and mitigation (e.g. through the protection and restoration of peat and peatlands to store and sequester carbon).”
“However there is now widespread agreement among scientists that we are living in an era of accelerated climate change, much of which can be attributed to increased human activity (for example through increased carbon emmissions from air pollution).”
The words in the phrase, ‘widespread agreement among scientists’, are words that can only be attributed to ‘conflict-of-interest’ based political consesus science, and NOT ‘factual science’.
“Climate change means that there are complex demands being placed on land for food, wildlife, recreation and development. Wildlife has adapted to climate change in the past but our modern landscapes – full of buildings, transport links and intensively managed farmland and fragmented natural habitats – present a new challenge to species. It is vital that we manage and use land sustainably, so it allows plants and animals to move and adapt to new conditions for survival as the climate changes. The Wildlife Trusts’ vision for A Living Landscape is working to bring about landscape scale restoration of the natural environment and adaptation to climate change, realising and using the multiple benefits provided by nature.”
“Protecting and restoring our natural environment and ecosystems is important in its own right…Flood prevention, crop pollination, carbon absorption, clean and healthy water sources – these benefits of our natural environment must all be considered and maximised as we prepare for the effects of climate change. Critically, we need to restore healthy, Living Landscapes that help to alleviate floods, control pollution and help us cope with extremes of temperature.”
“Many of The Wildlife Trusts’ Living Landscape schemes have been designed with climate change adaptation at the forefront. At the heart of Living Landscape approach is habitat restoration and connectivity.”
Climate Change & Wildlife
The Wildlife Trusts

Giammaria Ortes:
The Decadent Venetian Kook Who Originated The Myth of “Carrying Capacity”

GB 2293 SPNC
Royal Society of Wildlife Trusts
This catalogue was digitised by The National Archives as part of the National
Register of Archives digitisation project
The National Archive
National Registar of Archives – NRA 24457
Centre for Urban and Regional Studies University of Birmingham and Institute of Agricultural History
University of Reading
A list of the historical records of the Society for the Promotion of Nature Conservation
Compiled by Philippa Bassett as part of a research project funded by the Social Science Research Council
August 1980
World Wide Fund for Nature, WWF (formerly named the, World Wildlife Fund, WWF)
World Wildlife Fund / World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)
Founders –
Bernhard of Lippe-Biesterfeld
Julian Huxley
Max Nicholson
Peter Scott
Guy Mountfort
Godfrey A. Rockefeller
“The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) is an international non-governmental organization founded on April 29, 1961, and is working on issues regarding the conservation, research and restoration of the environment. It was formerly named the World Wildlife Fund… It is the world’s largest conservation organization with over 5 million supporters worldwide, working in more than 100 countries, supporting around 1,300[5] conservation and environmental projects. WWF is a foundation,[6] in 2010 deriving 57% of funding from individuals and bequests, 17% from government sources (such as the World Bank, DFID, USAID) and 11% from corporations.”
“The group’s mission is “to stop the degradation of the planet’s natural environment and to build a future in which humans live in harmony with nature.”[7] Currently, much of its work focuses on the conservation of three biomes that contain most of the world’s biodiversity: oceans and coasts, forests, and freshwater ecosystems. Among other issues, it is also concerned with endangered species, pollution and climate change.”

It is recommended that the entire page is read to acquire a brief working understanding and background to the WWF
World Wide Fund for Nature
There is nothing cuddly about the WWF

The 1001: A Nature Trust
The 1001 Club
The 1001 Club
Bankers, Intelligence Agents, and Raw Materials Executives Striving for a Sustainable Future
* pre-December 2014 archived version of the site – Institute for the Study of Globalization and Covert Politics
Institute for the Study of Globalization and Covert Politics
1001 Club – Incomplete Membership List
The ‘1001 Club’ – a nature trust
Transnational Classes and International Relations
By Kees Van der Pijl
For Educational Purposes Only –
Dr. Claude Martin, Switzerland – Board Member, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Former Director General of WWF

Their Patron is HRH The Prince of Wales.
The Wildlife Trusts
Our mission
To protect and sustainably manage natural ecosystems of the world; to conserve their biodiversity, with emphasis on threatened habitats and endangered species
How We Work –
World Conservation and Wildlife Trust
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
International Development United States Agency For
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue Nw
Washington, DC 20004
A privately held company in Washington, DC
International Development United States Agency For
Usaid M/Oaa/Cas
1300 Penn Avenue Nw Room 824-C
Washington, DC 20004 – View Map
Phone: (212) 713-4320
Own This Business?
A privately held company in Washington, DC
USAID Acronym List
“Bernhard helped found the World Wildlife Fund (later renamed World Wide Fund for Nature), becoming its first President in 1961, and in 1970 establishing the WWF’s financial endowment “The 1001: A Nature Trust”. In 1954, he was a co-founder of the international Bilderberg Group, which has met annually since then to discuss corporate globalization…”
The Prince eventually went to work for the German chemical giant IG Farben, then the world’s fourth-largest company (which survives today as BASF, AGFA, and Bayer). After training, Bernhard became secretary to the board of directors at the Paris office in 1935.
“Prince Bernhard was a member of the “Reiter-SS”, a mounted unit of the SS and joined the Nazi party.[7] He later also joined the National Socialist Motor Corps.”
“With his global contacts, Bernhard in May 1954, was a key figure in organising a meeting at the Bilderberg Hotel in the Netherlands for the business elite and intellectuals of the Western World to discuss the economic problems in the face of what they characterized as the growing threat from Communism. This first meeting was successful, and it became an annual gathering known as the Bilderberg Group. The idea for the European Union, first proposed by Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950, was encouraged at Bilderberg.”
It is recommended that the entire page is read
Prince Bernhard of Lippe-Biesterfeld

Anton Rupert
Sir Julian Huxley is brother to Aldous Huxley
Huxley, Arnold Family Tree
“Sir Julian Sorell Huxley FRS[1] (22 June 1887 – 14 February 1975) was a British evolutionary biologist, eugenicist, and internationalist.”
“He was secretary of the Zoological Society of London (1935–1942), the first Director of UNESCO, a founding member of the World Wildlife Fund and the first President of the British Humanist Association.”
“In 1959 he received a Special Award of the Lasker Foundation in the category Planned Parenthood – World Population. Huxley was a prominent member of the British Eugenics Society and its president from 1959–1962.”
Later career –
“Huxley, a lifelong internationalist with a concern for education, got involved in the creation of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and became the organization’s first director-general in 1946.”
“In a fortnight he dashed off a 60-page booklet on the purpose and philosophy of UNESCO, eventually printed and issued as an official document. There were, however, many conservative opponents of his scientific humanism. His idea of restraining population growth with birth control …”
“Huxley’s internationalist and conservation interests also led him, with Victor Stolan, Sir Peter Scott, Max Nicholson and Guy Mountfort, to set up the WWF (World Wide Fund for Nature under its former name of the World Wildlife Fund).”
Recommended that the entire page is read
Julian Huxley
UNESCO Its Purpose and Its Philosophy – The Task of Unifying the World Mind
World Evolutionary Humanism, Eugenics and UNESCO Pt 1

World Evolutionary Humanism, Eugenics and UNESCO Pt 2

Global Depopulation and the Eugenics Agenda (Full)

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (French: Organisation des Nations unies pour l’éducation, la science et la culture; UNESCO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations (UN). Its purpose is to contribute to peace and security by promoting international collaboration through education, science, and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, the rule of law, and human rights along with fundamental freedom proclaimed in the United Nations Charter.[1] It is the heir of the League of Nations’ International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation.
UNESCO – It’s Evil Purpose and Philosophy

“He was then married to Margaret “Margo” Kuhn Rockefeller for fifty three years.”
Godfrey A. Rockefeller
Margaret Kuhn Rockefeller daughter of Richard Parker Kuhn
Caroline Parker Kuhn
b. 26 January 1925, d. 30 April 2011
Richard P. Kuhn 1916
1916 Class Crest
Cullum No. 5528 • Jun 28, 1963 • Died in Bedford Hills, New York
Interred in St. Matthews Churchyard, Bedford Hills, NY
Kuhn, Loeb & Co.
In 1914 a few families (blood or business related) owning controlling stock in existing banks (such as in New York City) caused those banks to purchase controlling shares in the Federal Reserve regional banks. Examination of the charts and text in the House Banking Committee Staff Report of August, 1976 and the current stockholders list of the 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks show this same family control.
Who Is Running America ?
For Educational Purposes Only –
We note UNESCO’s founding influence in the settlement of the Self-Ennobling Ones intellectual copyright institutional agrrangements in securing inheritance rights, between themselves as gods, towards their successor-assigns as beneficiaries, when we read –
1. Introduction, page 533
“This essay returns to such an “old” conflict in the development of international copyright dating back to the signing of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works on 9 September 1886. Translation, a constant “ pierre d’achoppement” in the evolutionary history of the Berne Convention, caused problems from the outset. These returned with full force at the fourth conference for the revision of the Berne Convention in Stockholm on 11-14 June 1967. Described by one participant as “the worst experience in the history of international copyright conventions”, Stockholm marked the culmination of several years’ discussion on the viability of the international copyright regime to accommodate the needs of developing nations.”
2. Brussels, June 1948, page 534
“The Bureaux Internationaux Réunis pour la Protection de la Propriété Intellectuelle (BIRPI), located in Berne, was the administrative seat from the inception of the treaty, and oversaw revision conferences in Berlin (1908), Rome(1928) and then Brussels (1948).”
subtitle, 2. Brussels, June 1948, page 535
“The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),played an important role in trying to redress a situation in which, in copyright terms, the world emerged from the war “virtually split into two entirely separate and independent parts”. Launched in 1945 as successor to the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC), UNESCO anchored its copyright policy in the 1948 Declaration on Human Rights.”

TIND Comment.-
UNESCO’s strategic deceptive foil of cover as camouflage, in the use of its development of “collectivist” terms for a “Declaration on Human Rights”, won them the approval of their competing proposals for the Self-Ennobling Ones to accept, as the best means of providing for an excuse to convince the victims of designed eugenicist wars, to relegate their ‘freedoms of independence’ to closer cooperation, or corporation, by compelling acquiescence of the general populace to such terms, out of “fear” of a repeat performance of world war, in it being said, that closer cooperation would quell the brutal urges of man.
They, the general populace at large, having no inkling whatsoever, that their compulsion to accept these copywritten terms had been by design, would also have no inkling, that UNESCO’s proposals had the further advantage of completely blinding them into not coming to an understanding that what was copywritten by them in turn, through the Self-Ennobling One’s instruments of deception, (without qualification under registration of ‘noncommital-to-contract’ to copywritten-countries, but merely to record), would effectively provide the means for the Self-Ennobling Ones agencies to ‘collectively’ interfere in the ownership of their intellectual property.
Interfere as superior authorities to a now admitted subordinate position of a registrant, and that through copyright registration ‘without qualificaiton’, it was an admission that registrants were mentally incapable of maintaining their own affairs, in the same way a child lacked the mental capacity to provide for themselves, by demonstrably not understanding the requirements of speaking-up in their own self-interests, as an adult would understand to do, given their circumstances in the world as being functionally independent, and with the recognition that that independence brings, of having the cognition to voice that independence in line with their self-interests and circumstances.
Failure to speak-up, would no doubt reflect on their mental capacities as being immature and in need of assistance by rightly remaining in the charge of an adult parental figure providing for stewardship, to guide and decide what would be in their best interests. Such arrangements, of course, could find their victims intellectual rights the subject of ‘profitable confiscation’ by any number of ‘seemingly’ legitimate means.
The reader to the preceding may remain unperturbed, since as it ought to be well known, any formal relationships entered into, calls for honesty in the interests of fairness for obvious, fair and full disclosure to be provided – for the very reason that genuine ‘fairness’ can only be the basis of authenticity and therefore legitamcy – otherwise, whatsoever arrangements were entered into without full disclosure made known as to the true nature of the operations of the parties to a relationship, would justly render those arrangements ‘null and void’. And that being the case, without having even to speak of ‘the requirements of justice’.
Continuing, page 535

End TIND Comment

The self ennobling ones of course are the Vatican…

“Prior to the Brussels conference, UNESCO had already noted how copyright was a “barrier” to the “free flow of culture among all the peoples of the world”. In the next few years, UNESCO instigated a number of copyright initiatives culminating in 1952 with The Universal Copyright Convention(UCC).
In sum, the UCC offered an international multilateral convention with lower levels of protection than Berne, thus providing a vehicle for the US to come into the fold of multilateral international copyright agreements. Several specificities in national legislation kept the US outside Berne until 1989; these were primarily the compulsory registration of copyright and the controversial manufacturing requirement, which afforded English-language books copyright protection in the US only if manufacturedon American soil. As a compromise between the formal registration required by US law and the no formalities-Berne framework, the UCC introduced the use of a © symbol, making it possible for the US and other countries to sign the UCC without having to change their national legislation.”
Volume 7, Issue 3, December 2010
Eva Hemmungs Wirtén
United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property
World Intellectual Property Organisation
Multilateral agreements and a TRIPS-plus world:
The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO)
We read –
“It is the heir of the League of Nations’ International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation.”
Of course, the League of Nations was the first fictitious global corporate institution, ready in waiting, to ‘tranisition’ the people of the world into ‘the idea of global governance’ after the scare tactics of fear in World War One (WWI), soon to be replaced with its permanent successor, after the follow up of WWII to ‘secure’ the establishment of the strategy of fear in bringing about an immovable seat for the readiness of permanent global governance in the form of the United Nations –
League of Nations
In developments further unifying and solidifying the Self-Ennobling Ones fictitious interests in stealthly centralizing the means with which to confiscate the physical realm, we read, they have superseded and made obsolete the Universal Copyright Convention for that of the World Trade Organisation’s ‘Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS)’ –
“Since almost all countries are either members or aspiring members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and are thus conforming to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS), the UCC has lost significance.”
Universal Copyright Convention
Again, we note the understandings reached concerning issues of creative intellectual property rights, when we learn of those acting on behalf of the authors to creative property, organizing their interests through their forums to settle on agreement, when we read, 1. Introduction, page 1, of, ‘Selling Books: The League of Nations and the Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights in the 1930s’ –
After a series of bilateral agreements the main European book trading countries enacted in cooperation with culturally aware publishers and authors a multilateral agreement, the Berne Convention, in 1886. Although the American states passed the first Inter-American copyright agreement at the same time, the Convention of Montevideo in 1889, it was the Berne Convention, which proofed to be a reliable political instrument in the course of the twentieth century pointing the way ahead when intellectual property rights were institutionalized on a global scale first with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 1967 followed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994.
Selling Books: The League of Nations and the Globalization of Intellectual Property
Rights in the 1930s
Isabella Löhr, University of Leipzig
But wait, returning to the excellent writings from COLONIAL COPYRIGHT, POSTCOLONIAL PUBLICS, those who don’t understand the dangers fictions can pose, are to be further deluded into thinking that they matter, with this –
7. Epilogue: Geneva, October 2007, page 549
“In October 2007, the WIPO Development Agenda was established by the WIPO General Assembly. Scholars have hailed it as a possible new departure for the international intellectual property regime, which has been completely dominated since 1994 by the trade-based rationales of WTO and the infamous Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). TRIPS has eclipsed and helped render the UCC “wholly peripheral to the current international copyright framework” and is targeted for critique by developing nations, echoing concerns already articulated already in 1967. The Stockholm Protocol, a satellite “disconnected from its orbit”, is another instrument relegated to the cemetery where intellectual property texts go to die. Yet, each of these texts is part of the historical foundation from which the Development Agenda draws inspiration.
Although it remains to be seen what clout the Development Agenda will have to redress past wrongs and more recent sins in the power relations between developed and developing nations, it proposes substantial changes in both its general direction and WIPO governance. In 1884, 1885, and 1886 only a handful of nations were present to formulate the original Berne Convention, and they represented a diplomatic elite. Fifty-seven states and more than 400 inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations were present in Stockholm. At present, WIPO counts 184 member nations and over 250 NGOs among those who participate in Geneva deliberations. NGOs now out weigh states in total number, greatly accelerating the presence of civil society in these global arenas, suggesting, to Ruth Okediji, that states are not as important in setting the agenda as they used to be.”
Volume 7, Issue 3, December 2010
Eva Hemmungs Wirtén

Can You Spell Rebellion?

November 10, 2016

“Okay this is interesting, but what if we take it farther? I think that we have a reason to think that Washington and Oregon would fit nicely into this model, but we should probably also add Hawaii too with future plans to annex New York and Vermont. Yeah that is it.”—Bob Ferris

Tech founders want California to secede
Some big names in Silicon Valley have a simple message after Donald Trump’s victory: We want out.

Former Executive Director at Cascadia Wildlands

Former Executive Director at RE Sources for Sustainable Communities

Former Interim Executive Director at Center for a New American Dream

Former Executive Director at Yestermorrow Design/Build School

Former Executive Director at Community Environmental Council (CEC)

Former Vice President (United States) at Chesapeake Bay Foundation

Former Vice President Species Conservation at Defenders of Wildlife

Former Director, Field Programs at Wildlife Habitat Council

Studied Biology at UC Santa Cruz

Studied Zoology at San Jose State University

Studied Biology and Environmental Studies at University of California, Santa Cruz

Went to Chester F. Awalt High School

Went to Los Altos High School

Lives in Eugene, Oregon

Married to Carlene Marie Ramus who is an Architect..

Oh the irony…

Oaths Of U.S. Public Office

October 30, 2016

When we consider what is being said here, we must consider how we have been treated in this society. as subjects rather than joint owners of the U.S. corporation. As citizens not as sovereigns. Know them by their fruits..What are they teaching versus what they are actually doing..


There is much debate on oaths of office of government officials flying around and people have no idea what they are talking about so I decided to let you in on some research and common logical understanding. Almost 100 percent of the people believe the government people should take the oaths and if they don’t then when they come after people, like you and me , Mr. and Mrs. John Q .. They have no authority to come after you, you say. What I would like to make certain is that the oath taken to the letter of the law is what they are following when they “come after you.” People do not realize that when the oath is cited it is cited for a contract called a constitution of the corporation known as either the State or the United States. It is not taken of, by, or for the people of the country. To prove that states and counties are corporations is found in the North Carolina Library cite on the internet at In there is this excerpt and applies to every state in the union.

The County as a Body Politic and Corporate

A county, as a defined geographic subdivision of the state, serves many purposes. Churches, civic clubs, and other societal institutions use counties as convenient subdivisions for their own purposes. The business world may assign sales territories and franchises to areas composed of one or more counties. The county may play a role in the psychology of people born and raised “in the country” – it serves to establish where they are from and who they are, thus becoming a part of their personal identity. But the county was created in the first instance by the state as a political unit, and this remains its primary purpose.

More than forty years ago, the North Carolina Supreme Court was called upon to define a county from a legal point of view. (In the case, Wake County was a litigant and the court spoke in terms of that county, but what the Court had to say is equally true of the other ninety-nine counties):

“Wake County is a body politic and corporate, created by the General Assembly of North Carolina for certain public and political purposes. Its powers as such, both express and implied, are conferred by statutes, enacted from time to time by the General Assembly, and are exercised by its Board of Commissioners …. In the exercise of ordinary government functions, [counties] are simply agencies of the State, constituted for the convenience of local administration in certain portions of the State’s territory, and in the exercise of such functions they are subject to almost unlimited legislative control, except when the power is restricted by constitutional provisions.”

The language used by the court is important as it established the definition of a county. A county, according to the court, is a “body politic and corporate.” A body politic is a civil division of the state for purposes of governmental administration. A body corporate is a legal entity. In private law, a corporation is a legal person. A county is a legal entity or corporation of a special sort and with a public function. As such, it can buy and hold property, sue and be sued, and enter into contracts – all functions necessary to make its work as a body politic effective.

In O’Berry, State Treasurer v. Mecklenburg County, [198 N.C. 357,151 S.E. 880 ( 1930)], the court stated that “the weight of authority is to effect that all the powers and functions of a county bear reference to the general policy of the State, and are in fact an integral portion of the general administration of State policy. Historically, the primary purpose for erecting a county was to serve state purposes and to perform state functions in a given area rather than to serve the purposes of a particular geographic community. (By way of contrast, a city was primarily formed at the request of the people within its jurisdiction to serve the needs of the inhabitants.)

For the Supreme Court to say that “all the powers and functions of a county bear reference to the general policy of the State and are in fact an integral portion of the general administration of State policy” is not as restrictive as might at first reading appear. “State policy” is a very broad frame of reference; it can touch any aspect of local government. Thus, the truly significant nugget in the Supreme Court’s definition of the role of counties is its statement that in the exercise of their functions, counties “are subject to almost unlimited legislative control, except when the power is restricted by constitutional provisions.” In effect, if the General Assembly can be persuaded to assign counties any given power or responsibility, and, if the Constitution does not prohibit it, that assignment becomes state policy for county administration.

Now that you have irrefutable proof that you , when calling yourself a “state citizen” are an integral part of a corporate body and you yourself take on the character of a legal entity called a “person”. All statutes are private corporate law and they all address a “person” and not a man. The common law of God would address a man and that’s why there is no common law anymore when dealing with statutes which are all corporate in nature. Now you know why they refer to you as person. This I had explained on the articles on and in my book, The New History of America , and in Which One Are You published back in 1990. In fact I include here one small portion of Which One Are You here to show even back then I was on point.

What was the American before he “resided” in a State? Wasn’t he a “free white person?” See Works of John Adams, 213 and Thayer, Cases on Constitutional Law,note on page 459, stated in part:

“The proper english meaning of the term `citizen’ imported membership of a borough or local municipal corporation. The usual word for a man’s political relation to the monarch of the state was `subject’. . . . The word `citizen’ is not found in any of our state constitutions before that of Massachusetts (1780); . . . In the Declaration of Independence (1776), we read it once, `He has restrained our fellow citizens,’ etc. and once in the Articles of Confederation.”

Yet no one will take the time to understand what I had written was all documented and then proceed to engage in arguments with each other that go nowhere except on a merry- go- round. So, both the State government and the United States government are corporate entities of the Crown/Vatican cabal and the people you call criminals are just obeying the contract set upon them when they took office. With that in mind we go to oaths.

The oath thus states in part; I, ……… do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support, obey, and defend the Constitution …

Now we go to the paper called the Constitution of the United States. The two main parts that this oath apply are Article VI and the 14th Amendment Paragraph three. Remember that the oath is to a contract that they have to abide by and nothing else. You are not involved nor mentioned in the oath and with good reason. So let’s see what they are abiding with.

First is the oath to Article VI.

United States Article VI protects the debt owed to the creditor King by each debtor colony. It protects the treaties the Colonies had with the King and proves the works of James Montgomery that we are still under the control of the King by treaty.

Article VI, U.S. Constitution. 1. All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid as against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation. [The King’s money and debt is protected and this is their solemn oath they take.]

2. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made [the treaty of 1606 and 1782 made with the King], or which shall be made [Jay’s treaty of 1792 with the King], under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; [despite anything to the contrary Treaties are part of the Constitution and reign supreme over all you people despite the fact you have nothing to do with it. You said it’s your constitution, live with it and don’t complain]; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”

To prove these treaties are the “Law of the Land” here is what the HAMILTON v. EATON, 1 N.C. 641 (1796), HAMILTON v. EATON. 2 Mart., 1. U.S. Circuit Court. (June Term, 1796.), had to say.

“Headnote 5. Besides, the treaty of 1783 was declared by an Act of Assembly of this State passed in 1787, to be law in this State, and this State by adopting the Constitution of the United States in 1789, declared the treaty to be the supreme law of the land. The treaty now under consideration was made, on the part of the United States, by a Congress composed of deputies from each state, to whom were delegated by the articles of confederation, expressly, “the sole and exclusive right and power of entering into treaties and alliances”; and being ratified and made by them, it became a complete national act, and the act and law of every state.

If, however, a subsequent sanction of this State was at all necessary to make the treaty law here, it has been had and repeated. By a statute passed in 1787, the treaty was declared to be law in this State, and the courts of law and equity were enjoined to govern their decisions accordingly. And in 1789 was adopted here the present Constitution of the United States, which declared that all treaties made, or which should be made under the authority of the United States, should be the supreme law of the land; and that the judges in every state should be bound thereby; anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary not withstanding. Surely, then, the treaty is now law in this State, and the confiscation act, so far as the treaty interferes with it, is annulled.”

Evidence what was stated by the same court; that those that join the State are “SUBJECTS” not sovereigns:

“By an act of the Legislature of North Carolina, passed in April, 1777, it was, among other things, enacted, “That all persons, being subjects of this State, and now living therein, or who shall hereafter come to live therein, who have traded immediately to Great Britain or Ireland, within ten years last past, in their own right, or acted as factors, storekeepers, or agents here, or in any of the United States of America, for merchants residing in Great Britain or Ireland, shall take an oath of abjuration and allegiance, or depart out of the State.”

Well I told you that the masses just traded kings and are now “citizens” (slaves) of a State rather than the King of England. The Declaration took you out from under the King but left the people worse off, because they became the credit of the State to pay the King’s money that the people were indebted to in the first place. This is an excerpt from my book The New History of America

Now that you know what the paramount reason for the US Constitution was, how can we say the government officials are shrugging their oath and not obeying it? They are very much in conformance to that oath that they defend the Crowns property and to make sure that treaties before 1787 and immediately after it, like they knew Jay’s treaty of 1791 was to be consummated, were adhered to. You cannot say no to this. So lets go to the 14th Amendment and see if they are following their oaths to obey and defend the contract of the corporations (state and federal).

But before we do we must set the stage for the reason the judges are only following their oath to the contract, which is in no way directed to you as you are not a party to the contract and never were. I will get to the Bill of Rights later.

Bouviers Law Dictionary defines Insurgent as, “One who is concerned in an insurrection. He differs from a rebel in this, that rebel is always understood in a bad sense, or one who unjustly opposes the constituted authorities; insurgent may be one who justly opposes the tyranny of constituted authorities. The colonists who opposed the tyranny of the English government were insurgents, not rebels.”

As a side note , the 1933 trading with the enemy Act did not, I repeat, DID NOT make you the enemy of the United States despite what anyone says or writes about it. What it did was make you the enemy of the banks and that’s why the banks were closed for 6 days so the President could issue them licenses to deal with the enemy, A.K.A. the American people. Your ancestors were already the enemy starting 1863, therefore, you too are the enemy and there is nothing you can do about that unless you want to declare war against this government who is the conqueror. We are a people under conquest and if you have not read up on conquest I suggest you do so, soon. James Montgomery is the expert on this and has written extensively about it.

Now we go to Article 149 of the Lieber Code or General Order 100 of President Lincoln, who, prior to this, through 12 Stat 319, made you the enemy of the “State”. That 1863 statute was never repealed and exists in Title 50 Sections 212, 213 and 215 as well as in Title 28 sections 2461 to 2465 seizure. If you do not believe me go and pull those Title 50 sections and go to the source law. Also note what Title 50 is named. So they still, unbeknownst to you, operate under this General Order 100. This is the part that they use against us today because remember, WE ARE STILL THE ENEMY INSURGENTS when attacking any laws of government. Read carefully.

The Lieber Code of 1863


Washington, April 24, 1863.

The following “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,” prepared by Francis Lieber, LL.D., and revised by a board of officers, of which Maj. Gen. E. A. Hitchcock is president, having been approved by the President of the United States, he commands that they be published for the information of all concerned.

SECTION X.–Insurrection– Civil war–Rebellion.

149. Insurrection is the rising of people in arms against their government, or portion of it, or against one or more of its laws, or against an officer or officers of the government. It may be confined to mere armed resistance, or it may have greater ends in views.

Now, “when we go against one or more of its laws”, and that is the income tax laws, the Registration laws, the Driver license laws or any one of the multitude of laws they make, we are in insurrection because we are, remember, the enemy. When we defy an officer collecting revenue by any means then we are going “against an officer or officers” and are therefore considered dangerous and an insurrectionist.

In comes the 14th amendment paragraph to which the judge took his oath to obey. It states- “No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disabilities.

Please note the passage “or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof”. This is a key part because the judges are bound by oath to obey Article VI as to the debts to be paid and this paragraph three. You might see that paragraph four states that we cannot question the debt. We are a declared enemy under 12 Stat 319 and a declared enemy of the banks under section 5 b of the Trading with the Enemy Act that was not repealed with the rest of the act. Then if the judge, in ruling in the enemy’s favor in any revenue laws, would be violating his oath of office. So you cannot complain that they are not following the oath of office. If ruling against the IRS they would then be violating their oath to protect the status quo of the corporation.

We now proceed to the oath as was stated above. No where did they state in the oath that they were to obey the Bill of Rights as that is a separate document only dealing with United States citizens. It carries its own Preamble. It does not deal with the people in the states. The ultimate case for this is the John Barron vs the Mayor and the City of Baltimore, which I have gone into detail on the site, so there is no need to go into and rehash it here. Too many people have understood this Bill of Rights to be the Constitution. Again, it is not and rather to go into it here; that too is on the site.

In conclusion the judges are really obeying the contract that they have with the states and the Crown and they have no contract with you, the private man. See 14 Ga 438, Padleford and Fay vs the Mayor and City of Savannah. But you, as the private man, are a man under conquest and you better understand that because that misunderstanding is your downfall and why you cry that the judges are not obeying the contract. You just have been lied to all your lives and believe all the myths from the inception of this government called the United States, that that contract was formed by people like you, for you. That is the biggest lie in history. In fact I wrote an article called The Big Lie and the Big Lie II. In order to understand conquest I suggest you read James Montgomery’s articles on under Knowledge is Freedom.

The Informer 7-24-2002